An Appropriate Role for the Leadership: A Quantitative Analysis of the Effects of House Leadership on Open-Seat Races

This paper investigates the effects on open-seat races in the United States House of Representatives. This project focuses on the influence that the House leadership exerts on races. Generally, the leadership influences race through spending by party organizations and leadership visits. During each election cycle, national party organizations spend millions of dollars to get their candidates into office. I have developed a multiple regression model that measures different types of spending from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, and the Republican National Committee and the effects of these spending types on the election results. Also, the study examines the number of visits by each party’s leadership to each race. I introduced control variables that account for the year, the competitiveness of each race, and the individual candidate fundraising. In terms of statistical significance, the results were mixed showing one type of party spending to be highly influential in the outcome of the race. Competitiveness and individual candidate fundraising also achieved statistical significance. The study also includes a qualitative investigation of leadership visits and individual case studies in order to understand better the way in which the data interact in real campaigns.

Intergenerational Conflict and the Political Economy of School Spending

In this paper we use survey data to examine support among voters from different age cohorts for public school spending. The survey asked potential voters in California how they intended to vote on two initiatives, one a statewide initiative that would increase spending on public schools throughout the state and the other a local initiative that would increase spending only in the respondent's local school district. We find that older voters without children generally oppose increases in state spending but are much more willing to support local spending. We examine two explanations for this voting pattern, namely the capitalization of local spending into housing values and intergenerational altruism. Our results do not strongly favor one explanation over the other. Consequently, we conclude that both factors (capitalization and intergenerational altruism) probably play important roles in sustaining support among older voters for local school spending.

The Congressional Budget Process and the Aggregate Level of Spending

This paper analyzes whether the Congressional budget process (instituted in 1974) leads to lower aggregate spending than does the piece-meal appropriations process that preceded it. Previous theoretical analysis, using spatial models of legislator preferences, is inconclusive. This paper uses a model of interest group lobbying, where a legislature determines spending on a national public good and on subsidies to subsets of the population that belong to nationwide sector-specific interest groups. In the appropriations process, the Appropriations Committee proposes a budget, maximizing the joint welfare of voters and the interest groups, that leads to overspending on subsidies. In the budget process, a Budget Committee proposes an aggregate level of spending (the budget resolution); the Appropriations Committee then proposes a budget. If the lobby groups are not subject to a binding resource constraint, the two institutional structures lead to identical outcomes. With such a constraint, however, there is a free rider problem among the groups in lobbying the Budget Committee, as each group only obtains a small fraction of the benefits from increasing the aggregate budget. If the number of groups is sufficiently large, each takes the budget resolution as given, and lobbies only the Appropriations Committee. The main results are that aggregate spending is lower, and social welfare higher, under the budget process; however, provision of the public good is suboptimal. The paper also presents two extensions: the first endogenizes the enforcement of the budget resolution by incorporating the relevant procedural rules into the model. The second analyzes statutory budget rules that limit spending levels, but can be revised by a simple majority vote. In each case,the free rider problem prevents the groups from securing the required changes to procedural and budget rules.