3 resultados para Parametric VaR (Value-at-Risk)

em University of Connecticut - USA


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This study evaluates the effects of the new Government regulations in regards to the relative value notification of retirement plan options. It looks at how these new regulations will affect retirement plan option utilization and how retirement plan providers will change options in order to minimize risk.

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The study investigates the role of credit risk in a continuous time stochastic asset allocation model, since the traditional dynamic framework does not provide credit risk flexibility. The general model of the study extends the traditional dynamic efficiency framework by explicitly deriving the optimal value function for the infinite horizon stochastic control problem via a weighted volatility measure of market and credit risk. The model's optimal strategy was then compared to that obtained from a benchmark Markowitz-type dynamic optimization framework to determine which specification adequately reflects the optimal terminal investment returns and strategy under credit and market risks. The paper shows that an investor's optimal terminal return is lower than typically indicated under the traditional mean-variance framework during periods of elevated credit risk. Hence I conclude that, while the traditional dynamic mean-variance approach may indicate the ideal, in the presence of credit-risk it does not accurately reflect the observed optimal returns, terminal wealth and portfolio selection strategies.

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This paper re-examines the social versus private value of lawsuits when both injurers and victims can take care. The basic conclusions of that literature remain valid in this context: the private and social values generally differ, and there is no necessary relationship between them, meaning that there may be either too many or too few suits. Introducing the possibility of victim care does, however, alter the calculation of the deterrent effect of lawsuits. In particular, because allowing suits tends to reduce the incentives for victims to invest in precaution, the social value of prohibiting suits increases in direct relation to the productivity of victim care in lowering accident risk.