An Appropriate Role for the Leadership: A Quantitative Analysis of the Effects of House Leadership on Open-Seat Races

This paper investigates the effects on open-seat races in the United States House of Representatives. This project focuses on the influence that the House leadership exerts on races. Generally, the leadership influences race through spending by party organizations and leadership visits. During each election cycle, national party organizations spend millions of dollars to get their candidates into office. I have developed a multiple regression model that measures different types of spending from the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, the National Republican Congressional Committee, and the Republican National Committee and the effects of these spending types on the election results. Also, the study examines the number of visits by each party’s leadership to each race. I introduced control variables that account for the year, the competitiveness of each race, and the individual candidate fundraising. In terms of statistical significance, the results were mixed showing one type of party spending to be highly influential in the outcome of the race. Competitiveness and individual candidate fundraising also achieved statistical significance. The study also includes a qualitative investigation of leadership visits and individual case studies in order to understand better the way in which the data interact in real campaigns.

The Real Exchange Rate in Small Open Developed Economies: Evidence from Cointegration Analysis

We examine the effects of the terms of trade and the expected real interest rate differential on the real exchange rate in a sample of small open developed economies. We employ cointegration analysis to search for possible long-term linkages. We find that while both the terms of trade and the expected real interest rate differentials affect the real exchange rate in the long run, the role of the terms of trade generally proves more consistent across countries. The speed of adjustment for the expected real interest rate differential in the error-correction model, however, is quantitatively larger than it is for the terms of trade.