Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Input Aggregation in Models of Data Envelopment Analysis: A Statistical Test with an Application to Indian Manufacturing

A problem frequently encountered in Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is that the total number of inputs and outputs included tend to be too many relative to the sample size. One way to counter this problem is to combine several inputs (or outputs) into (meaningful) aggregate variables reducing thereby the dimension of the input (or output) vector. A direct effect of input aggregation is to reduce the number of constraints. This, in its turn, alters the optimal value of the objective function. In this paper, we show how a statistical test proposed by Banker (1993) may be applied to test the validity of a specific way of aggregating several inputs. An empirical application using data from Indian manufacturing for the year 2002-03 is included as an example of the proposed test.