Schools and Housing Markets: An Examination of School Segregation and Performance in Connecticut

This paper examines the relationship between house price levels, school performance, and the racial and ethnic composition of Connecticut school districts between 1995 and 2000. A panel of Connecticut school districts over both time and labor market areas is used to estimate a simultaneous equations model describing the determinants of these variables. Specifically, school district changes in price level, school performance, and racial and ethnic compositions depend upon each other, labor market wide changes in these variables, and the deviation of each school district from the overall metropolitan area. The specification is based on the differencing of dependent variables, as opposed to the use of level or fixed effects models and lagging level variables beyond the period over which change is considered; as a result the model is robust to persistence in the sample. Identification of the simultaneous system arises from the presence of multiple labor market areas in the sample, and the assumption that labor market changes in a variable due not directly influence the allocation of households across towns within a labor market area. We find that towns in labor markets that experience an inflow of minority households have greater increases in percent minority if those towns already ahve a substantial minoritypopulation. We find evidence that this sorting proces is reflected in housing price changes in the low priced segment of the housing market, not in the middle and upper segments.

Do Labor Market Imperfections Increase Trade Protection? A Theoretical Investigation

Labor market imperfections are commonly believed to be a major reason for imposing trade impediments. In this paper, I introduce labor market rigidities that are prevalent in continental European countries into the well-known protection for sale model proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). I show that contrary to commonly held views, imperfections in the labor market do not necessarily increase equilibrium trade protection. A testable equilibrium trade protection equation is also derived. The findings in this paper are hence particularly relevant for empirical tests of trade policy determinants in economies with more regulated labor markets.

Sequential Pre-Marital Investment Games: Implications for Unemployment

Agents on the same side of a two-sided matching market (such as the marriage or labor market) compete with each other by making self-enhancing investments to improve their worth in the eyes of potential partners. Because these expenditures generally occur prior to matching, this activity has come to be known in recent literature (Peters, 2007) as pre-marital investment. This paper builds on that literature by considering the case of sequential pre-marital investment, analyzing a matching game in which one side of the market invests first, followed by the other. Interpreting the first group of agents as workers and the other group as firms, the paper provides a new perspective on the incentive structure that is inherent in labor markets. It also demonstrates that a positive rate of unemployment can exist even in the absence of matching frictions. Policy implications follow, as the prevailing set of equilibria can be altered by restricting entry into the workforce, providing unemployment insurance, or subsidizing pre-marital investment.

Asset Pricing with Heterogeneous Agents, Incomplete Markets and Trading Constraints

The consumption capital asset pricing model is the standard economic model used to capture stock market behavior. However, empirical tests have pointed out to its inability to account quantitatively for the high average rate of return and volatility of stocks over time for plausible parameter values. Recent research has suggested that the consumption of stockholders is more strongly correlated with the performance of the stock market than the consumption of non-stockholders. We model two types of agents, non-stockholders with standard preferences and stock holders with preferences that incorporate elements of the prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In addition to consumption, stockholders consider fluctuations in their financial wealth explicitly when making decisions. Data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics are used to calibrate the labor income processes of the two types of agents. Each agent faces idiosyncratic shocks to his labor income as well as aggregate shocks to the per-share dividend but markets are incomplete and agents cannot hedge consumption risks completely. In addition, consumers face both borrowing and short-sale constraints. Our results show that in equilibrium, agents hold different portfolios. Our model is able to generate a time-varying risk premium of about 5.5% while maintaining a low risk free rate, thus suggesting a plausible explanation for the equity premium puzzle reported by Mehra and Prescott (1985).

Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets

In my recent experimental research of wholesale electricity auctions, I discovered that the complex structure of the offers leaves a lot of room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti- competitive and inefficient outcomes in the market. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. In this paper, using the experimental method I compare the performance of two complex-offer auctions (COAs) against the performance of a simple-offer auction (SOA), in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs --- fixed and variable ---through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that the SOA significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the COAs and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.

Does the Presence of Surplus Labor Hinder Production in Indian Manufacturing?

Input congestion occurs at a given input bundle when the assumption of free disposability of inputs does not hold and an increase in input leads to a decline in output. In this paper we employ the nonparametric method of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to examine the question on input congestion with respect to labor, using state level data from the Annual Survey of Industries for the period 1986-87 through 1999-2000. When the standard assumption of strong disposability is relaxed for the labor inputs, the nonparametric analysis of state-level data from Indian manufacturing shows considerable measure of labor input congestion. While in selected states congestion comes from non-production workers as well, the principal source of labor congestion is production labor. There is no evidence that the problem of labor congestion has become less severe during the post-Reform years. It appears that market forces without any major institutional changes in enforcement of labor discipline cannot eliminate congestion.

What Is Known about Testing for Discrimination: Lessons Learned by Comparing across Different Markets

The paper provides a fairly comprehensive examination of recent empirical work on discrimination within economics. The three major analytical approaches considered are traditional regression analysis of outcomes, paired testing or audits, and finally analysis of performance where higher group performance suggests that a group has been treated disfavorably. The review covers research in the labor, credit, and consumption markets, as well as recent studies of discrimination within the legal system. The review suggests that the validity of interpreting observed racial differences as discrimination depends heavily on whether the analysis is based on a sample that is representative of a population of individuals or households or based on a sample of market transactions, as well as the analyst?s ability to control for heterogeneity within that sample. Heterogeneous firm behavior and differentiated products, such as those found in labor and housing markets, also can confound empirical analyses of discrimination by confusing the allocation of individuals across firms or products with disparate treatment or by ignoring disparate impacts that might arise based on that allocation.