Total Factor Productivity and Monetary Policy: Evidence from Conditional Volatility

This paper empirically assesses whether monetary policy affects real economic activity through its affect on the aggregate supply side of the macroeconomy. Analysts typically argue that monetary policy either does not affect the real economy, the classical dichotomy, or only affects the real economy in the short run through aggregate demand new Keynesian or new classical theories. Real business cycle theorists try to explain the business cycle with supply-side productivity shocks. We provide some preliminary evidence about how monetary policy affects the aggregate supply side of the macroeconomy through its affect on total factor productivity, an important measure of supply-side performance. The results show that monetary policy exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on the supply-side of the macroeconomy. Moreover, the findings buttress the importance of countercyclical monetary policy as well as support the adoption of an optimal money supply rule. Our results also prove consistent with the effective role of monetary policy in the Great Moderation as well as the more recent rise in productivity growth.

Expectations, and Credibility in a Model of Monetary Policy

Recent monetary history has been characterized by monetary authorities which have been, alternatively hard and soft on inflation. In a vintage capital framework, investment decisions are not easily reversed. Therefore, expectations of policy as well as current policy are important to the investment decision. Here, a vintage capital model is used to assess the value of central bank credibility for a policy change. Policy in this model is assumed to be private information of the central banker. Agents learn about that policy which to study the ensuing transitional dynamics following a change in monetary policy regime.

Monetary Policy in a Portfolio Balance Model with Endogenous Physical Capital

We develop a portfolio balance model with real capital accumulation. The introduction of real capital as an asset as well as a good produced and demanded by firms enriches extant portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination. We show that expansionary monetary policy causes exchange rate overshooting, not once, but twice; the secondary repercussion comes through the reaction of firms to changed asset prices and the firms' decisions to invest in real capital. The model sheds further light on the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates, and it suggests that changes in corporate sector profitability may affect exchange rates through portfolio diversification in corporate securities.

Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Overshooting, and Endogenous Physical Capital

We develop an open economy macroeconomic model with real capital accumulation and microeconomic foundations. We show that expansionary monetary policy causes exchange rate overshooting, not once, but potentially twice; the secondary repercussion comes through the reaction of firms to changed asset prices and the firms' decisions to invest in real capital. The model sheds further light on the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates, and it suggests that changes in corporate sector profitability may affect exchange rates through international portfolio diversification in corporate securities.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).

Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Note

Kydland and Prescott (1977) develop a simple model of monetary policy making, where the central bank needs some commitment technique to achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Although not their main focus, they illustrate the difference between consistent and optimal policy in a sequential-decision one-period world. We employ the analytical method developed in Yuan and Miller (2005), whereby the government appoints a central bank with consistent targets or delegates consistent targets to the central bank. Thus, the central bank s welfare function differs from the social welfare function, which cause consistent policy to prove optimal.

Monetary Policy Under a Currency Board

The consensus view is that central banks under currency boards do not have tools for active monetary policy. In this paper, we analyze the foreign exchange fee as a monetary policy instrument that can be used by a central bank under a currency board. We develop a general equilibrium model showing that changes in this fee may have the same effects as a change in the monetary policy stance. Thus central banks under the currency board are shown to have an avenue to implement active monetary policy.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

The Geographic Distribution of the Size and Timing of Monetary Policy Actions

This paper examines the magnitude and timing of the effects of changes in the monetary base on the aggregate and regional changes in bank loans within the United States. We consider both Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions, and individual states and the District of Columbia for our regional analysis. The empirical analysis provides some insight on the bank-lending channel of monetary policy. We find strong evidence of a 4-quarter lag in the effect of changes in the monetary base on bank loans. That finding proves robust across all regions and nearly all states.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the central bank should adopt a loss function that differs from the social loss function. Carefully designing the central bank s loss function with consistent targets can harmonize optimal and consistent policy. This desirable result emerges from two observations. First, the social loss function reflects a normative process that does not necessarily prove consistent with the structure of the microeconomy. Thus, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Second, an optimal loss function for the central bank must depend on the structure of that microeconomy. In addition, this paper shows that control theory provides a benchmark for institution design in a game-theoretical framework.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Multisectorial Economies

We develop a two-sector economy where each sector is classified as classical/Keynesian (contract/noncontract) in the labor market and traded/nontraded in the product market. We consider the effects of changes in monetary and exchange rate policy on sectoral and aggregate prices and outputs for different sectoral characterizations. Duca (1987) shows that nominal wage rigidity facilitates the effectiveness of monetary policy even in the classical sector. We demonstrate that trade price rigidity provides a similar path for the effectiveness of monetary policy, in this case, even when both sectors are classical.

The Relationship between Large Fiscal Adjustments and Short-Term Output Growth Under Alternative Fiscal Policy Regimes

A small, but growing, body of literature searches for evidence of non-Keynesian effects of fiscal contractions. That is, some evidence exists that large fiscal contractions stimulate short-run economic activity. Our paper continues this research effort by systematically examining the effects, if any, of unusual fiscal events - either non-Keynesian results within a Keynesian model or Keynesian results within a neoclassical model -- on short-run economic activity. We examine this issue within three separate models -- a St. Louis equation, a Hall-type consumption equation, and a growth accounting equation. Our empirical findings are mixed, and do not provide strong systematic support for the view that unusually large fiscal contractions/expansions reverse the effects of normal fiscal events. Moreover, we find only limited evidence that trigger points are empirically important.

Macroeconomic Rationality and Lucas' Misperceptions Model: Further Evidence from Forty-One Countries

Several researchers have examined Lucas's misperceptions model as well as various propositions derived from it within a cross-section empirical framework. The cross-section approach imposes a single monetary policy regime for the entire period. Our paper innovates on existing tests of those rational expectations propositions by allowing the simultaneous effect of monetary and short run aggregate supply (oil price) shocks on output behavior and the employment of advanced panel econometric techniques. Our empirical findings, for a sample of 41 countries over 1949 to 1999, provide evidence in favor of the majority of rational expectations propositions.

Is the Great Moderation Ending? UK and US Evidence

The Great Moderation, the significant decline in the variability of economic activity, provides a most remarkable feature of the macroeconomic landscape in the last twenty years. A number of papers document the beginning of the Great Moderation in the US and the UK. In this paper, we use the Markov regime-switching models of Hamilton (1989) and Hamilton and Susmel (1994) to document the end of the Great Moderation. The Great Moderation in the US and the UK begin at different point in time. The explanations for the Great Moderation fall into generally three different categories -- good monetary policy, improved inventory management, or good luck. Summers (2005) argues that a combination of good monetary policy and better inventory management led to the Great Moderation. The end of the Great Moderation, however, occurs at approximately the same time in both the US and the UK. It seems unlikely that good monetary policy would turn into bad policy or that better inventory management would turn into worse management. Rather, the likely explanation comes from bad luck. Two likely culprits exist . energy-price and housing-price shocks.

A General Schema for Optimal Monetary Policymaking: Objectives and Rules

This paper examines four equivalent methods of optimal monetary policymaking, committing to the social loss function, using discretion with the central bank long-run and short-run loss functions, and following monetary policy rules. All lead to optimal economic performance. The same performance emerges from these different policymaking methods because the central bank actually follows the same (similar) policy rules. These objectives (the social loss function, the central bank long-run and short-run loss functions) and monetary policy rules imply a complete regime for optimal policy making. The central bank long-run and short-run loss functions that produce the optimal policy with discretion differ from the social loss function. Moreover, the optimal policy rule emerges from the optimization of these different central bank loss functions.