Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Note

Kydland and Prescott (1977) develop a simple model of monetary policy making, where the central bank needs some commitment technique to achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Although not their main focus, they illustrate the difference between consistent and optimal policy in a sequential-decision one-period world. We employ the analytical method developed in Yuan and Miller (2005), whereby the government appoints a central bank with consistent targets or delegates consistent targets to the central bank. Thus, the central bank s welfare function differs from the social welfare function, which cause consistent policy to prove optimal.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Multisectorial Economies

We develop a two-sector economy where each sector is classified as classical/Keynesian (contract/noncontract) in the labor market and traded/nontraded in the product market. We consider the effects of changes in monetary and exchange rate policy on sectoral and aggregate prices and outputs for different sectoral characterizations. Duca (1987) shows that nominal wage rigidity facilitates the effectiveness of monetary policy even in the classical sector. We demonstrate that trade price rigidity provides a similar path for the effectiveness of monetary policy, in this case, even when both sectors are classical.