A Simple Statistical Test of Violation of the Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization

A problem with a practical application of Varian.s Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization is that an observed violation may be due to random variation in the output quantities produced by firms rather than due to inefficiency on the part of the firm. In this paper, unlike in Varian (1985), the output rather than the input quantities are treated as random and an alternative statistical test of the violation of WACM is proposed. We assume that there is no technical inefficiency and provide a test of the hypothesis that an observed violation of WACM is merely due to random variations in the output levels of the firms being compared.. We suggest an intuitive approach for specifying a value of the variance of the noise term that is needed for the test. The paper includes an illustrative example utilizing a data set relating to a number of U.S. airlines.

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This paper models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminent domain, holdouts are inevitable, threatening costly delay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminent domain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain, thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiate prices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessive transfer of land to the developer.

Efficiency in Deregulated Electricity Markets: Offer Cost Minimization vs. Payment Cost Minimization Auction

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the efficiency performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed mechanism. The analysis highlights the importance of considering strategic behavior when comparing different institutional systems. We find that in concentrated markets, neither auction mechanism can guarantee an efficient allocation. The advantage of the current mechanism increases with increased price competition if market demand is perfectly inelastic. However, if market demand has some responsiveness to price, the superiority of the current auction with respect to efficiency is not that obvious. We present a case where the proposed auction outperforms the current mechanism on efficiency even if all offers reflect true production costs. We also find that a market designer might face a choice problem with a tradeoff between lower electricity cost and production efficiency. Some implications for social welfare are discussed as well.

The Kepler Problem (the road to Bohr)

The classical Kepler problem is reviewed in depth in preparation to studying the Bohr model of the atom.