Strategic Behavior in Day-Ahead and Real-Time Markets for Electricity: Offer Cost or Payment Cost Minimization?

This study compares the procurement cost-minimizing and productive efficiency performance of the auction mechanism used by independent system operators (ISOs) in wholesale electricity auction markets in the U.S. with that of a proposed alternative. The current practice allocates energy contracts as if the auction featured a discriminatory final payment method when, in fact, the markets are uniform price auctions. The proposed alternative explicitly accounts for the market clearing price during the allocation phase. We find that the proposed alternative largely outperforms the current practice on the basis of procurement costs in the context of simple auction markets featuring both day-ahead and real-time auctions and that the procurement cost advantage of the alternative is complete when we simulate the effects of increased competition. We also find that a trade-off between the objectives of procurement cost minimization and productive efficiency emerges in our simple auction markets and persists in the face of increased competition.

Analysis of Synthetic Diamond Wafer Interferograms Using a Parallelized Simulated Annealing Algorithm

Diamonds are known for both their beauty and their durability. Jefferson National Lab in Newport News, VA has found a way to utilize the diamond's strength to view the beauty of the inside of the atomic nucleus with the hopes of finding exotic forms of matter. By firing very fast electrons at a diamond sheet no thicker than a human hair, high energy particles of light known as photons are produced with a high degree of polarization that can illuminate the constituents of the nucleus known as quarks. The University of Connecticut Nuclear Physics group has responsibility for crafting these extremely thin, high quality diamond wafers. These wafers must be cut from larger stones that are about the size of a human finger, and then carefully machined down to the final thickness. The thinning of these diamonds is extremely challenging, as the diamond's greatest strength also becomes its greatest weakness. The Connecticut Nuclear Physics group has developed a novel technique to assist industrial partners in assessing the quality of the final machining steps, using a technique based on laser interferometry. The images of the diamond surface produced by the interferometer encode the thickness and shape of the diamond surface in a complex way that requires detailed analysis to extract. We have developed a novel software application to analyze these images based on the method of simulated annealing. Being able to image the surface of these diamonds without requiring costly X-ray diffraction measurements allows rapid feedback to the industrial partners as they refine their thinning techniques. Thus, by utilizing a material found to be beautiful by many, the beauty of nature can be brought more clearly into view.

An Experimental Study of Complex-Offer Auctions: Payment Cost Minimization vs. Offer Cost Minimization

A Payment Cost Minimization (PCM) auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization (OCM) auction to be used in wholesale electric power markets with the intention to lower the procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns about this proposal have relied on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using an experimental approach, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that both auctions result in start-up fees that are significantly higher than the start-up costs. Overall, the two auctions perform similarly in terms of procurement cost and efficiency. Surprisingly, I do not find a substantial difference between less market power and more market power designs. Both designs result in similar inefficiencies and equally higher procurement costs over the competitive prediction. The PCM auction tends to have lower price volatility than the OCM auction when the market power is minimal but this property vanishes in the designs with market power. These findings lead me to conclude that both the PCM and the OCM auctions do not belong to the class of truth revealing mechanisms and do not easily elicit competitive behavior.

A Simple Statistical Test of Violation of the Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization

A problem with a practical application of Varian.s Weak Axiom of Cost Minimization is that an observed violation may be due to random variation in the output quantities produced by firms rather than due to inefficiency on the part of the firm. In this paper, unlike in Varian (1985), the output rather than the input quantities are treated as random and an alternative statistical test of the violation of WACM is proposed. We assume that there is no technical inefficiency and provide a test of the hypothesis that an observed violation of WACM is merely due to random variations in the output levels of the firms being compared.. We suggest an intuitive approach for specifying a value of the variance of the noise term that is needed for the test. The paper includes an illustrative example utilizing a data set relating to a number of U.S. airlines.

Efficiency in Deregulated Electricity Markets: Offer Cost Minimization vs. Payment Cost Minimization Auction

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the efficiency performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed mechanism. The analysis highlights the importance of considering strategic behavior when comparing different institutional systems. We find that in concentrated markets, neither auction mechanism can guarantee an efficient allocation. The advantage of the current mechanism increases with increased price competition if market demand is perfectly inelastic. However, if market demand has some responsiveness to price, the superiority of the current auction with respect to efficiency is not that obvious. We present a case where the proposed auction outperforms the current mechanism on efficiency even if all offers reflect true production costs. We also find that a market designer might face a choice problem with a tradeoff between lower electricity cost and production efficiency. Some implications for social welfare are discussed as well.

Fourier Series by Least Square Minimization

An introduction to Fourier Series based on the minimization of the least square error between an approximate series representation and the exact function.