A Comparison of Two-Market Bertrand Duopoly and Two-Market Cournot Duopoly

In a two-market Bertrand duopoly,each of two firms chooses one of two markets and a price in that market. All four choices are made simultaneously. In a two-market Cournot duopoly, the firms choose quantities rather than prices.It is well known that in the one-market case the threat of price undercutting means that Bertrand equilibrium prices and profits will be lower and quantities higher than Cournot equilibrium prices, profits and quantities.We find a quite different consequence of price undercutting in two-market duopoly. In the two-market case the threat of price undercutting means that Bertrand equilibria are in continuous mixed strategies, while every Cournot duopoly has an equilibrium in pure strategies, or in strategies that are pure in each market.

US Corporate Default Swap Valuation: The Market Liquidity Hypothesis and Autonomous Credit Risk

This paper develops a reduced form three-factor model which includes a liquidity proxy of market conditions which is then used to provide implicit prices. The model prices are then compared with observed market prices of credit default swaps to determine if swap rates adequately reflect market risks. The findings of the analysis illustrate the importance of liquidity in the valuation process. Moreover, market liquidity, a measure of investors. willingness to commit resources in the credit default swap (CDS) market, was also found to improve the valuation of investors. autonomous credit risk. Thus a failure to include a liquidity proxy could underestimate the implied autonomous credit risk. Autonomous credit risk is defined as the fractional credit risk which does not vary with changes in market risk and liquidity conditions.

Responding to Price Signals in Communal Agriculture: Shaker Hog Production, 1788-1850

Isolated Shaker communal farms stressed self-sufficiency as an ideal but carefully chose which goods to buy and sell in external markets and which to produce and consume themselves. We use records of hog slaughter weights to investigate the extent to which the Shakers incorporated market-based price information in determining production levels of a consumption good which they did not sell in external markets: pork. Granger causality tests indicate that Shaker pork production decisions were influenced as hypothesized, strongly by corn prices and weakly by pork prices. We infer that attention to opportunity costs of goods that they produced and consumed themselves was a likely factor aiding the longevity of Shaker communal societies.

Pricing and Policy Problems in the Northeast Fluid Milk Industry

This article documents the need for reform of milk pricing in the Northeast. The New York price gouging law can be recast as a fair share law. This new milk policy “kills two birds with one stone.” It corrects regional inequities in raw milk pricing by reforming the pricing of milk at retail by limiting and redistributing excessive retail margins to farmers and consumers. The fair share policy relieves allocative price inefficiency, improves the performance of the federal milk market order pool, and the general performance of the Northeast dairy farming and fluid milk industries.