The Political Economy of Constitutional Choice: A Study of the 2005 Kenyan Constitutional Referendum

Recent studies of the linkages between the wealth of nations and the institutions of governance suggest that concentrating political power in a monarchy or a ruling coalition impedes economic growth and, moreover, that while power-diffusing reforms can enhance the wellbeing of society in general, opposition by groups benefitting from the status quo is predictable. In November 2005, Kenyans rejected a proposed constitution that, despite promises made by their new chief executive, would not have lessened the powers of the presidency. Using a unique, constituency-level dataset on the referendum vote, we estimate a model of the demand for power diffusion and find that ethnic groups' voting decisions are influenced by their expected gains and losses from constitutional change. The results also highlights the importance of ethnic divisions in hindering the power-diffusion process, and thus establish a channel through which ethnic fragmentation adversely impacts economic development.

Efficient Production of Wins in Major League Baseball

Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is applied to Major League Baseball salary and performance data from 1985 to 2006 in order to identify those teams which produced wins most efficiently and the characteristics which lead to efficient production. It is shown that on average both National and American League teams over allocate the most resources to first basemen. Additionally, it is found that National League teams should allocate significantly more resources towards starting pitching while American League teams should allocate significantly more resources toward second base. It is also observed that efficient teams use younger less experienced players and employ rosters with a greater number of previous all star appearances.

A Principal-Agent Model of Contracting in Major League Baseball

Traditional economic analyses of the reserve clause in major league baseball view it as having arisen from the superior bargaining of owners compared to players. This article interprets it instead as promoting efficient investment by teams in player development, given the transferability of player skills to other teams. Using a principal-agent framework, the article shows that limited player mobility emerges as part of the optimal contract between players (principals) and teams (agents).