Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets

This paper examines how preference correlation and intercorrelation combine to influence the length of a decentralized matching market's path to stability. In simulated experiments, marriage markets with various preference specifications begin at an arbitrary matching of couples and proceed toward stability via the random mechanism proposed by Roth and Vande Vate (1990). The results of these experiments reveal that fundamental preference characteristics are critical in predicting how long the market will take to reach a stable matching. In particular, intercorrelation and correlation are shown to have an exponential impact on the number of blocking pairs that must be randomly satisfied before stability is attained. The magnitude of the impact is dramatically different, however, depending on whether preferences are positively or negatively intercorrelated.

Paths to Power: The Ascendance of Contemporary Democratic Congressional Leaders

Congressional leadership is a constantly changing phenomenon. New factors and actors are constantly affecting and altering which members ascend to positions of leadership and how that leadership is exercised. A critical change that has occurred in recent times is the inclusion of women in the congressional leadership for the first time. While there has been a great deal of theoretical work on gender and on congressional leadership, there have not been enough actual female leaders in Congress to perform a study until now. The present study examines the impact of gender, committee/legislative performance, ideology, and fundraising ability on leadership ascendancy. The variables are investigated through a comparative case study of Rep. Nancy Pelosi, Rep. Rosa DeLauro, Sen. Hillary Clinton and Sen. Harry Reid.