Improving Surveying Accuracy and Efficiency in Connecticut: An Accuracy Assessment of GEOID03 and GEOID09

Comparing published NAVD 88 Helmert orthometric heights of First-Order bench marks against GPS-determined orthometric heights showed that GEOID03 and GEOID09 perform at their reported accuracy in Connecticut. GPS-determined orthometric heights were determined by subtracting geoid undulations from ellipsoid heights obtained from a network least-squares adjustment of GPS occupations in 2007 and 2008. A total of 73 markers were occupied in these stability classes: 25 class A, 11 class B, 12 class C, 2 class D bench marks, and 23 temporary marks with transferred elevations. Adjusted ellipsoid heights were compared against OPUS as a check. We found that: the GPS-determined orthometric heights of stability class A markers and the transfers are statistically lower than their published values but just barely; stability class B, C and D markers are also statistically lower in a manner consistent with subsidence or settling; GEOID09 does not exhibit a statistically significant residual trend across Connecticut; and GEOID09 out-performed GEOID03. A "correction surface" is not recommended in spite of the geoid models being statistically different than the NAVD 88 heights because the uncertainties involved dominate the discrepancies. Instead, it is recommended that the vertical control network be re-observed.

A Bargaining Model of Holdouts and Takings

The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This paper models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminent domain, holdouts are inevitable, threatening costly delay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminent domain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain, thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiate prices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessive transfer of land to the developer.

Economies of Scale and Cost Efficiencies: A Panel-Data Stochastic-Frontier Analysis of Real Estate Investment Trusts

This paper extends the existing research on real estate investment trust (REIT) operating efficiencies. We estimate a stochastic-frontier panel-data model specifying a translog cost function, covering 1995 to 2003. The results disagree with previous research in that we find little evidence of scale economies and some evidence of scale diseconomies. Moreover, we also generally find smaller inefficiencies than those shown by other REIT studies. Contrary to previous research, the results also show that self-management of a REIT associates with more inefficiency when we measure output with assets. When we use revenue to measure output, selfmanagement associates with less inefficiency. Also contrary with previous research, higher leverage associates with more efficiency. The results further suggest that inefficiency increases over time in three of our four specifications.