Legal Change: Integrating Selective Litigation, Judicial Preferences, and Precedent

The claim that the common law displays an economic logic is a centerpiece of the positive economic theory of law. A key question in this literature is whether this outcome is due to the conscious efforts of judges, or the result of invisible hand processes. This paper develops a model in which to two effects combine to determine the direction of legal change. The main conclusions are, first, that judicial bias can prevent the law from evolving toward efficiency if the fraction of judges biased against the efficient rule is large enough; and second, that precedent affects the rate of legal change but not its direction.

Murky Waters: The Law and Economics of Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks

The salvage of historic shipwrecks involves a debate between salvors, who wish to maximize profit, and archeologists, who wish to preserve historical value. Traditionally, salvage of shipwrecks has been governed by admiralty law, but the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 transferred title of historically important wrecks in U.S. waters to the state in whose waters the wreck is found, thereby abrogating admiralty law. This paper examines incentives to locate and salvage historic wrecks under traditional admiralty law and proposes an efficient reward scheme. It then re-considers current U.S. and international law in light of the results.