Rough Waters: Life at Sea in the 19th Century

This talk consists of two parts - first part deals with what Jeffrey Bolster called ���The Changing Nature of Maritime Insurrection���- and I will tie that into some research that I did on a New York clipper ship called the Contest. The second part of the talk will look at the rise of seafarer���s missions and that will tie Roald Kverndal���s magnum opus Seamen���s Missions: Their Origin and Early Growth into some research that I did on the earliest work done in New York among seafarers that pre-dated the American Seamen���s Friend Society.

Wage Premia in Employment Clusters: Agglomeration Economies or Worker Heterogeneity?

The correlation between wage premia and concentrations of firm activity may arise due to agglomeration economies or workers sorting by unobserved productivity. A worker's residential location is used as a proxy for their unobservable productivity attributes in order to test whether estimated work location wage premia are robust to the inclusion of these controls. Further, in a locational equilibrium, identical workers must receive equivalent compensation so that after controlling for residential location (housing prices) and commutes workers must be paid the same wages and only wage premia arising from unobserved productivity differences should remain unexplained. The models in this paper are estimated using a sample of male workers residing in 33 large metropolitan areas drawn from the 5% Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) from the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. We find that wages are higher when an individual works in a location that has more workers or a greater density of workers. These agglomeration effects are robust to the inclusion of residential location controls and disappear with the inclusion of commute time suggesting that the effects are not caused by unobserved differences in worker productivity. Extended model specifications suggest that wages increase with the education level of nearby workers and the concentration of workers in an individual's own industry or occupation.

The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs

Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.