Did Impending War in Europe Help Destroy the Gold Bloc in 1936? An Internal Inconsistency Hypothesis

This paper investigates the gold bloc operated between France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium, especially over the period after the USA left the gold standard in March 1933 to its end in September 1936. It enquires into the effect of military-political developments in Germany and Italy on the sustainability of the gold bloc between its members. Juxtaposed is the view of leading political scientists, such as Henry Kissinger, who see impending war in Europe as deeply and adversely affecting psychology in Europe, and what may be called the standard "economists' view" that sees the demise of the gold bloc as being caused almost exclusively by economic factors. Developing concepts of external and internal inconsistency of the gold bloc, this investigation concludes that both economic and military-political developments played important roles in destroying the last vestiges of the gold standard.

Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Overshooting, and Endogenous Physical Capital

We develop an open economy macroeconomic model with real capital accumulation and microeconomic foundations. We show that expansionary monetary policy causes exchange rate overshooting, not once, but potentially twice; the secondary repercussion comes through the reaction of firms to changed asset prices and the firms' decisions to invest in real capital. The model sheds further light on the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates, and it suggests that changes in corporate sector profitability may affect exchange rates through international portfolio diversification in corporate securities.

International Money and Finance

We discuss the effectiveness of pegged exchange rate regimes from an historical perspective, drawing conclusions for their effectiveness today. Starting with the classical gold standard period, we point out that a succession of pegged regimes have ended in failure; except for the first, which was ended by the outbreak of World War I, all of the others we discuss have been ended by adverse economic developments for which the regimes themselves were partly responsible. Prior to World War II the main problem was a shortage of monetary gold that we argue is implicated as a cause of the Great Depression. After World War II, more particularly from the late-1960s, the main problem has been a surfeit of the main international reserve asset, the US dollar. This has led to generalized inflation in the 1970s and into the 1980s. Today, excessive dollar international base money creation is again a problem that could have serious consequences for world economic stability.