Using Leading Indicators to Forecast US Home Sales in a Bayesian VAR Framework

This paper uses Bayesian vector autoregressive models to examine the usefulness of leading indicators in predicting US home sales. The benchmark Bayesian model includes home sales, the price of homes, the mortgage rate, real personal disposable income, and the unemployment rate. We evaluate the forecasting performance of six alternative leading indicators by adding each, in turn, to the benchmark model. Out-of-sample forecast performance over three periods shows that the model that includes building permits authorized consistently produces the most accurate forecasts. Thus, the intention to build in the future provides good information with which to predict home sales. Another finding suggests that leading indicators with longer leads outperform the short-leading indicators.

An Experimental Study of Complex-Offer Auctions: Payment Cost Minimization vs. Offer Cost Minimization

A Payment Cost Minimization (PCM) auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization (OCM) auction to be used in wholesale electric power markets with the intention to lower the procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns about this proposal have relied on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using an experimental approach, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that both auctions result in start-up fees that are significantly higher than the start-up costs. Overall, the two auctions perform similarly in terms of procurement cost and efficiency. Surprisingly, I do not find a substantial difference between less market power and more market power designs. Both designs result in similar inefficiencies and equally higher procurement costs over the competitive prediction. The PCM auction tends to have lower price volatility than the OCM auction when the market power is minimal but this property vanishes in the designs with market power. These findings lead me to conclude that both the PCM and the OCM auctions do not belong to the class of truth revealing mechanisms and do not easily elicit competitive behavior.