Inflation Targeting and Output Growth: Evidence from Aggregate European Data

This paper evaluates inflation targeting and assesses its merits by comparing alternative targets in a macroeconomic model. We use European aggregate data to evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules under alternative inflation targets in terms of output losses. We employ two major alternative policy rules, forward-looking and spontaneous adjustment, and three alternative inflation targets, zero percent, two percent, and four percent inflation rates. The simulation findings suggest that forward-looking rules contributed to macroeconomic stability and increase monetary policy credibility. The superiority of a positive inflation target, in terms of output losses, emerges for the aggregate data. The same methodology, when applied to individual countries, however, suggests that country-specific flexible inflation targeting can improve employment prospects in Europe.

Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Note

Kydland and Prescott (1977) develop a simple model of monetary policy making, where the central bank needs some commitment technique to achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Although not their main focus, they illustrate the difference between consistent and optimal policy in a sequential-decision one-period world. We employ the analytical method developed in Yuan and Miller (2005), whereby the government appoints a central bank with consistent targets or delegates consistent targets to the central bank. Thus, the central bank s welfare function differs from the social welfare function, which cause consistent policy to prove optimal.

Quantile Inferences for Inflation and Its Variability: Does a Threshold Inflation Rate Exist?

Using quantile regressions and cross-sectional data from 152 countries, we examine the relationship between inflation and its variability. We consider two measures of inflation - the mean and median - and three different measures of inflation variability - the standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and median deviation. Using the mean and standard deviation or the median and the median deviation, the results support both the hypothesis that higher inflation creates more inflation variability and that inflation variability raises inflation across quantiles. Moreover, higher quantiles in both cases lead to larger marginal effects of inflation (inflation variability) on inflation variability (inflation). Using the mean and the coefficient of variation, however, the findings largely support no correlation between inflation and its variability. Finally, we also consider whether thresholds for inflation rate or inflation variability exist before finding such positive correlations. We find evidence of thresholds for inflation rates below 3 percent, but mixed results for thresholds for inflation variability.