Behavioral Implications of Knockout for the Dyslexia-Risk Gene Dcdc2 in Mice

Several genetic linkage and epidemiological studies have provided strong evidence that DCDC2 is a candidate gene for developmental dyslexia, a disorder that impairs a person’s reading ability despite adequate intelligence, education, and socio-economic status. Studies investigating embryonic intra-ventricular RNA interference (RNAi) of Dcdc2, a rat homolog of the DCDC2 gene in humans, indicate disruptions in neuronal migration in the rat cortex during development. Interestingly, these anatomical anomalies are consistent with post mortem histological analysis of human dyslexic patients. Other rodent models of cortical developmental disruption have shown impairment in rapid auditory processing and learning maze tasks in affected subjects. The current study investigates the rapid auditory processing abilities of mice heterozygous for Dcdc2 (one functioning Dcdc2 allele) and mice with a homozygous knockout of Dcdc2 (no functioning Dcdc2 allele). It is important to note that this genetic model for behavioral assessment is still in the pilot stage. However, preliminary results suggest that mice with a genetic mutation of Dcdc2 have impaired rapid auditory processing, as well as non-spatial maze learning and memory ability, as compared to wildtypes. By genetically knocking out Dcdc2 in mice, behavioral features associated with Dcdc2 can be characterized, along with other neurological abnormalities that may arise due to the loss of the functioning gene.

Endogenous Growth in the Presence of Informal Credit Markets: A Comparative Analysis Between Credit Rationing and Self-Revelation Regimes

This paper examines whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing in terms of growth. In a dynamic general equilibrium framework, we assume that firms are heterogenous with different degrees of risk and households invest in human capital development. With the help of Indian household level data we show that the informal market reduces the cost of rationing by increasing the growth rate by 0.7 percent. This higher growth rate, in the presence of an informal sector, is due to the ability of the informal market to separate the high risk from the low risk firms thanks to better information. But even after such improvement we do not get the optimum outcome. The findings, based on our second question, suggest that the revelation of firms' type, based on incentive compatible pricing, can lead to almost 2 percent higher growth rate as compared to the credit rationing regime with informal sector.