Gay Parenthood and the Revolution of the Modern Family: An Examination of the Unique Barriers Confronting Gay Adoptive Parents

Abstract: In recent decades, the structure of the American family has been revolutionized to incorporate families of diverse and unconventional compositions. Gay and lesbian couples have undoubtedly played a crucial role in this revolution by establishing families through the tool of adoption. Eleven adoptive parents from the state of Connecticut were interviewed to better conceptualize the unique barriers gay couples encounter in the process adoption. Both the scholarly research and the interview data illustrate that although gay couples face enormous legal barriers, the majority of their hardship comes through social interactions. As a result, the cultural myths and legal restrictions that create social hardships for gay adoptive parents forge a vicious and discriminatory cycle of marginalization that American legal history illustrates is best remedied through judicial intervention at the Supreme Court level. While judicial intervention, alone, cannot change the reality of gay parenthood, I argue that past judicial precedent illustrates that such change can serve as a tool of individual, political, and legal validation for the gay community for obtaining equal rights.

Stagnation and Change in Islamic History

There appear to be two seemingly contradictory images of economic change in the Islamic World and mixed evidence on whether Islamic societies have been open or conservative against modern ideas, technological advancements, and legal developments. Whereas a conservative attitude has been dominant in some societies and time periods, Muslims were at the forefront of scientific, technological, and legal developments in others. Rather than rely on ad hoc assumptions about the attitudes and characteristics of societies or the inherent qualities of new developments, this paper explains attitudes towards change by studying the political economy of the relationship between the rulers and the legal community. I extend recent theories of endogenous institutional change to develop a framework based on how rulers and legal community reacted to new developments immediately and how their strategic interaction unleashed an endogenous process toward change in the long run. Using this framework, I identify conditions under which new ideas, technologies, and legal developments have resulted in immediate change in Islamic societies. I also examine the process of change in the long run, whether and how immediate outcomes could be sustained over time as strategic interaction continued repeatedly.

Tax Collection in History

Methods of tax collection employed by modern governments seem dull when compared to the rich variety observed in history. Whereas most governments today typically use salaried agents to collect taxes, various other types of contractual relationships have been observed in history, including sharing arrangements which divide the tax revenue between the government and collectors at fixed proportions, negotiated payment schemes based on the tax base, and sale of the revenue to a collector in exchange for a lump-sum payment determined at auction. We propose an economic theory of tax collection that can coherently explain the temporal and spatial variation in contractual forms. We begin by offering a simple classification of tax collection schemes observed in history. We then develop a general economic model of tax collection that specifies the cost and benefits of alternative schemes and identifies the conditions under which a government would choose one contractual form over another in maximizing the net revenue. Finally, we use the conclusions of the model to explain some of the well-known patterns of tax collection observed in history and how choices varied over time and space.