Rights at Risk: Refugees in the New South Africa

This thesis seeks to analyze the relationship between public attitudes toward refugees in a refugee receiving state and the realization of the legal rights afforded refugees (de facto rights). I hypothesize that the more negative a host culture is toward refugees, the less refugees are able to realize their rights. Conversely, the more positive a host culture is toward refugees, the more refugees are able to realize their rights. I test the hypothesis through a case study of refugee populations in Cape Town, South Africa, based on research conducted from May to June 2007. The orientation (positive or negative) of the host culture's perceptions toward a refugee group (Independent Variable) is measured through: (1) a coded content analysis of the South African media, (2) a coded content analysis of semi-structured interviews, and (3) an assessment of secondary source public opinion surveys and reports. The realization of refugee rights (Dependent Variable) is operationalized as a function of two rights: (1) the right to personal physical integrity and (2) the right to protection from unlawful detention. These rights are measured by coding (1) media reports and (2) interviews, and by (3) assessing NGO reports and secondary source public opinion surveys. My empirical data shows that the cultural orientation toward refugees is not overwhelmingly negative, and the realization of rights is not conclusively "low." However, the frequency of data coded "negative" and "low" versus "positive" or "high" suggest that South Africans regard refugees somewhat negatively and that rights are not fully realized. This finding is strengthened by the analysis of secondary sources and field notes.

A Model of Rights

In this paper, we develop a simple model of the rights a government provides its citizenry. Rights are treated as public goods and taken as primitives in agents utility functions; each agent has preferences over the entire policy vector. We model the interaction among citi-zens and the government as a game in which an exogenous lobbying set makes contributions to the government to in uence policy formu-lation in the matter of rights. When examining contribution schedules comprising truthful Nash strategies, we find that members of the lob-bying set obtain rights closer to their most-preferred bundle, while the rights of non-lobbyers further diverge from their most-preferred bun-dle. Further, if the lobbying set comprises the entire population, the government s allocation of rights does not differ from the allocation achieved in the absence of contributions.

Economic Rights, Human Development Effort and Institutions

This paper focuses on the link between economic rights and institutions. Simple analysis of data is used to demonstrate countries' human development effort in advancing economics rights of the citizens. A country's human development effort is evaluated on the basis of the well-being of the poorest members of the society. An analysis of data reveals that there is a wide variation in countries' pro-poor stance. While it is accepted that positive rights are pro-poor, this paper argues that so too are negative economic rights and in fact the two are complements rather than substitutes. Classifying countries into human development income deficit and human development effort deficit, it is demonstrated that a large number of countries could achieve higher welfare levels for the poor if they improved on bother positive and negative economic rights. The paper attempts to explain variations in the observed commitment to economic rights by focusing on pro-poor institutions. The basic thesis advanced in the paper is that pro-poor policies are more likely to be implemented and sustained in those institutions where power is sufficiently diffused such that even the poor have leverage over policy outcomes. The paper focuses on how institutions impact on power diffusion and therefore the adoption of pro-poor growth and policies. The failure of countries to adopt pro-poor growth and policies is attributed to institutional failures manifested in concentration of power. The policy recommendations emanating from the analysis focus on institutional reforms to enhance power diffusion. These policies include enlarging the political space through democratization, strengthening institutions and capacity to fight corruption and improve transparency, and bringing the government closer to the people through appropriate design and implementation of decentralization schemes. Some recent examples of improvements in economic rights following power diffusion are provided.

Perpetual Conflict or Compromise? The Cost of Domestic Legitimacy in the Realm of Women's Human Rights: A Case Study on the Right to an Abortion

With its turbulent and volatile legal evolution, the right to an abortion in the United States still remains a highly contested issue and has developed into one of the most divisive topics within modern legal discourse. By deconstructing the political underpinnings and legal rationale of the right to an abortion through a systematic case law analysis, I will demonstrate that this right has been incrementally destabilized. This instability embedded in abortion jurisprudence has been primarily produced by a combination of textual ambiguity in the case law and judicial ambivalence regarding this complex area of law. In addition, I argue that the use of the largely discredited substantive due process doctrine to ground this contentious right has also contributed to the lack of legal stability. I assert that when these elements culminate in the realm of reproductive privacy the right to terminate a pregnancy becomes increasingly unstable and contested.