Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law

This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a criminal solicitation but who otherwise had no predisposition to commit a crime.

A Model of Rights

In this paper, we develop a simple model of the rights a government provides its citizenry. Rights are treated as public goods and taken as primitives in agents utility functions; each agent has preferences over the entire policy vector. We model the interaction among citi-zens and the government as a game in which an exogenous lobbying set makes contributions to the government to in uence policy formu-lation in the matter of rights. When examining contribution schedules comprising truthful Nash strategies, we find that members of the lob-bying set obtain rights closer to their most-preferred bundle, while the rights of non-lobbyers further diverge from their most-preferred bun-dle. Further, if the lobbying set comprises the entire population, the government s allocation of rights does not differ from the allocation achieved in the absence of contributions.

Criminal Solicitation, Entrapment, and the Enforcement of Law

This paper examines the optimal use of criminal solicitation as a law enforcement strategy. The benefits are greater deterrence of crime (due to the greater likelihood of apprehension), and the savings in social harm and apprehension costs as some offenders are diverted away from committing actual crimes through solicitation. The costs are the expense of hiring undercover cops and the greater likelihood of punishment. The optimal use of solicitation balances these factors. The paper also examines the justification for, and impact of, the entrapment defense, which exonerates those caught in a solicitation but otherwise not predisposed to commit a crime.

Rights at Risk: Refugees in the New South Africa

This thesis seeks to analyze the relationship between public attitudes toward refugees in a refugee receiving state and the realization of the legal rights afforded refugees (de facto rights). I hypothesize that the more negative a host culture is toward refugees, the less refugees are able to realize their rights. Conversely, the more positive a host culture is toward refugees, the more refugees are able to realize their rights. I test the hypothesis through a case study of refugee populations in Cape Town, South Africa, based on research conducted from May to June 2007. The orientation (positive or negative) of the host culture's perceptions toward a refugee group (Independent Variable) is measured through: (1) a coded content analysis of the South African media, (2) a coded content analysis of semi-structured interviews, and (3) an assessment of secondary source public opinion surveys and reports. The realization of refugee rights (Dependent Variable) is operationalized as a function of two rights: (1) the right to personal physical integrity and (2) the right to protection from unlawful detention. These rights are measured by coding (1) media reports and (2) interviews, and by (3) assessing NGO reports and secondary source public opinion surveys. My empirical data shows that the cultural orientation toward refugees is not overwhelmingly negative, and the realization of rights is not conclusively "low." However, the frequency of data coded "negative" and "low" versus "positive" or "high" suggest that South Africans regard refugees somewhat negatively and that rights are not fully realized. This finding is strengthened by the analysis of secondary sources and field notes.

The Congressional Budget Process and the Aggregate Level of Spending

This paper analyzes whether the Congressional budget process (instituted in 1974) leads to lower aggregate spending than does the piece-meal appropriations process that preceded it. Previous theoretical analysis, using spatial models of legislator preferences, is inconclusive. This paper uses a model of interest group lobbying, where a legislature determines spending on a national public good and on subsidies to subsets of the population that belong to nationwide sector-specific interest groups. In the appropriations process, the Appropriations Committee proposes a budget, maximizing the joint welfare of voters and the interest groups, that leads to overspending on subsidies. In the budget process, a Budget Committee proposes an aggregate level of spending (the budget resolution); the Appropriations Committee then proposes a budget. If the lobby groups are not subject to a binding resource constraint, the two institutional structures lead to identical outcomes. With such a constraint, however, there is a free rider problem among the groups in lobbying the Budget Committee, as each group only obtains a small fraction of the benefits from increasing the aggregate budget. If the number of groups is sufficiently large, each takes the budget resolution as given, and lobbies only the Appropriations Committee. The main results are that aggregate spending is lower, and social welfare higher, under the budget process; however, provision of the public good is suboptimal. The paper also presents two extensions: the first endogenizes the enforcement of the budget resolution by incorporating the relevant procedural rules into the model. The second analyzes statutory budget rules that limit spending levels, but can be revised by a simple majority vote. In each case,the free rider problem prevents the groups from securing the required changes to procedural and budget rules.

Property Law

This chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law. Property law is a fundamental part of social organization and is also fundamental to the operation of the economy because it defines and protects the bundle of rights that constitute property. Property law thereby creates incentives to protect and invest in assets and establishes a legal framework within which market exchange of assets can take place. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. The chapter will both examine the rationale for legal doctrine and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It will also examine various property rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property and state property. The guiding questions are: How are property rights established? What explains the variation in the types of property rights? What governs the use and transfer of rights? And, how are property rights enforced?

Does the Presence of Surplus Labor Hinder Production in Indian Manufacturing?

Input congestion occurs at a given input bundle when the assumption of free disposability of inputs does not hold and an increase in input leads to a decline in output. In this paper we employ the nonparametric method of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to examine the question on input congestion with respect to labor, using state level data from the Annual Survey of Industries for the period 1986-87 through 1999-2000. When the standard assumption of strong disposability is relaxed for the labor inputs, the nonparametric analysis of state-level data from Indian manufacturing shows considerable measure of labor input congestion. While in selected states congestion comes from non-production workers as well, the principal source of labor congestion is production labor. There is no evidence that the problem of labor congestion has become less severe during the post-Reform years. It appears that market forces without any major institutional changes in enforcement of labor discipline cannot eliminate congestion.