Efficiency and Continuity in Public Finance: The Ottoman System of Taxation

Economic historians have recently emphasized the importance of integrating economic and historical approaches in studying institutions. The literature on the Ottoman system of taxation, however, has continued to adopt a primarily historical approach, using ad hoc categories of classification and explaining the system through its continuities with the historical precedent. This paper integrates economic and historical approaches to examine the structure, efficiency, and regional diversity of the tax system. The structure of the system made it possible for the Ottomans to economize on the transaction cost of measuring the tax base. Regional variations resulted from both efficient adaptations and institutional rigidities.

Church and State

Church and state have historically had an uneasy relationship, sometimes close allies, at others harsh adversaries, and at still others largely independent of one another. This paper develops an economic model of this relationship, where the state's objective is to maximize net tax revenue, while the church provides religious goods. Religious goods benefit the state in two ways: first, they provide utility to citizens, thus allowing the state to extract more taxes before running up against citizens' reservation utility (the point at which they would revolt), and second, they potentially provide legitimacy to the state, thereby lowering the costs of tax collection. If the latter effect is strong enough, the state may find it optimal to take control of the church, either to enhance its legitimizing effect, or to suppress its de-legitimizing effect. To evaluate the model's implications, we use recent cross-country data on the relationship between religion and state, including measures coded from the 2001, 2003, and 2005 International Religious Freedom reports. We also examine in more detail some of the paradigmatic cases indicated by the model, presenting various types of evidence from current and historical examples of each case.

Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Nonoptimal Unbounded Infinite Horizon Economies

In applied work in macroeconomics and finance, nonoptimal infinite horizon economies are often studied in the the state space is unbounded. Important examples of such economies are single vector growth models with production externalities, valued fiat money, monopolistic competition, and/or distortionary government taxation. Although sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of Markovian equilibrium are well known for the compact state space case, no similar sufficient conditions exist for unbounded growth. This paper provides such a set of sufficient conditions, and also present a computational algorithm that will prove asymptotically consistent when computing Markovian equilibrium.