Conversations between Anthropologists and Economists

Interdisciplinary citation patterns and other indicators of the flow and sharing of academic knowledge suggest that economists and anthropologists do not talk to each other. Previous studies of this puzzling trend have typically attributed the problem to methodological differences between the two disciplines. Although there are significant differences between economics and anthropology in behavioral assumptions and modes of inquiry, similar differences exist between them and other disciplines (some with much heavier volumes of cross-citations with economics or anthropology), suggesting that the source of the problem lies elsewhere. This paper considers the problem at a deeper level by examining systematic differences in the preferences, capabilities, and literary cultures of economists and anthropologists. Adopting a rhetorical perspective, I consider not the firms, households, or tribes as the principal objective of analysis in the two disciplines, but the conversations between these units. These conversations (through non-verbal as well as verbal media) can be grouped into two genres, based on the type of problem they aim to solve. Those in the first genre aim to solve the problem of interest--how to align the incentives of the parties involved. Those in the second genre deal with the problem of knowledge--how to align localized, and dispersed information. Economists are interested and capable of dealing with primarily, if not exclusively, the first genre, and anthropologists focus on the second. This difference has far reaching consequences for how economists and anthropologists conduct their own scholarly conversations with their own colleagues, why they are having difficulty talking to each other across disciplinary boundaries, and what can be done to change the patterns of communication.

Some Identification Issues in Nonparametric Linear Models with Endogenous Regressors

In applied work economists often seek to relate a given response variable y to some causal parameter mu* associated with it. This parameter usually represents a summarization based on some explanatory variables of the distribution of y, such as a regression function, and treating it as a conditional expectation is central to its identification and estimation. However, the interpretation of mu* as a conditional expectation breaks down if some or all of the explanatory variables are endogenous. This is not a problem when mu* is modelled as a parametric function of explanatory variables because it is well known how instrumental variables techniques can be used to identify and estimate mu*. In contrast, handling endogenous regressors in nonparametric models, where mu* is regarded as fully unknown, presents di±cult theoretical and practical challenges. In this paper we consider an endogenous nonparametric model based on a conditional moment restriction. We investigate identification related properties of this model when the unknown function mu* belongs to a linear space. We also investigate underidentification of mu* along with the identification of its linear functionals. Several examples are provided in order to develop intuition about identification and estimation for endogenous nonparametric regression and related models.

Sustaining the Economic Rent of Oceanic Resources: The Case of Marine Protected Areas

This paper investigates economic aspects of marine protected areas (MPAs) that are closely related to the underlying marine biota. Many marine scientists recognize that enough is now known about the marine biology for the scientific siting of MPAs to protect marine environments that create associated economic values. Marine scientists have identified several objectives of MPAs. These include protection of genetic and biodiversity, increase in population levels and structures (e.g., age, size, fecundity), enrichment of ecosystems by promoting species interactions, and the protection of continental shelf landscapes from invasive human actions. Indeed, some marine scientists and fisheries economists view MPAs as an 'insurance policy' against over-fishing and other human uses of oceanic resources that have damaged so many of the world's fisheries. The economic analysis presented here pays attention to optimal zoning, policies to maintain sustainable economic rents, and the optimal policing of MPAs.

Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information

In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

Optimally Combining Censored and Uncensored Datasets

Economists and other social scientists often face situations where they have access to two datasets that they can use but one set of data suffers from censoring or truncation. If the censored sample is much bigger than the uncensored sample, it is common for researchers to use the censored sample alone and attempt to deal with the problem of partial observation in some manner. Alternatively, they simply use only the uncensored sample and ignore the censored one so as to avoid biases. It is rarely the case that researchers use both datasets together, mainly because they lack guidance about how to combine them. In this paper, we develop a tractable semiparametric framework for combining the censored and uncensored datasets so that the resulting estimators are consistent, asymptotically normal, and use all information optimally. When the censored sample, which we refer to as the master sample, is much bigger than the uncensored sample (which we call the refreshment sample), the latter can be thought of as providing identification where it is otherwise absent. In contrast, when the refreshment sample is large and could typically be used alone, our methodology can be interpreted as using information from the censored sample to increase effciency. To illustrate our results in an empirical setting, we show how to estimate the effect of changes in compulsory schooling laws on age at first marriage, a variable that is censored for younger individuals. We also demonstrate how refreshment samples for this application can be created by matching cohort information across census datasets.

Moment Based Inference with Stratified Data

Many datasets used by economists and other social scientists are collected by stratified sampling. The sampling scheme used to collect the data induces a probability distribution on the observed sample that differs from the target or underlying distribution for which inference is to be made. If this effect is not taken into account, subsequent statistical inference can be seriously biased. This paper shows how to do efficient semiparametric inference in moment restriction models when data from the target population is collected by three widely used sampling schemes: variable probability sampling, multinomial sampling, and standard stratified sampling.

Did Impending War in Europe Help Destroy the Gold Bloc in 1936? An Internal Inconsistency Hypothesis

This paper investigates the gold bloc operated between France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Belgium, especially over the period after the USA left the gold standard in March 1933 to its end in September 1936. It enquires into the effect of military-political developments in Germany and Italy on the sustainability of the gold bloc between its members. Juxtaposed is the view of leading political scientists, such as Henry Kissinger, who see impending war in Europe as deeply and adversely affecting psychology in Europe, and what may be called the standard "economists' view" that sees the demise of the gold bloc as being caused almost exclusively by economic factors. Developing concepts of external and internal inconsistency of the gold bloc, this investigation concludes that both economic and military-political developments played important roles in destroying the last vestiges of the gold standard.

The Secret Life of Mundane Transaction Costs

Transaction costs, one often hears, are the economic equivalent of friction in physical systems. Like physicists, economists can sometimes neglect friction in formulating theories; but like engineers, they can never neglect friction in studying how the system actually does let alone should work. Interestingly, however, the present-day economics of organization also ignores friction. That is, almost single-mindedly, the literature analyzes transactions from the point of view of misaligned incentives and (especially) transaction-specific assets. The costs involved are certainly costs of running the economic system in some sense, but they are not obviously frictions. Stories about frictions in trade are not nearly as intriguing as stories about guileful trading partners and expensive assets placed at risk. But I will argue that these seemingly dull categories of cost what Baldwin and Clark (2003) call mundane transaction costs actually have a secret life. They are at least as important as, and quite probably far more important than, the more glamorous costs of asset specificity in explaining the partition between firm and market. These costs also have a secret life in another sense: they have a secret life cycle. I will argue that these mundane transaction costs provide much better material for helping us understanding how the boundaries among firms, markets, and hybrid forms change over time.