A Median Voter Theorem for Postelection Politics

We analyze a model of 'postelection politics', in which (unlike in the more common Downsian models of 'preelection politics') politicians cannot make binding commitments prior to elections. The game begins with an incumbent politician in office, and voters adopt reelection strategies that are contingent on the policies implemented by the incumbent. We generalize previous models of this type by introducing heterogeneity in voters' ideological preferences, and analyze how voters' reelection strategies constrain the policies chosen by a rent-maximizing incumbent. We first show that virtually any policy (and any feasible level of rent for the incumbent) can be sustained in a Nash equilibrium. Then, we derive a 'median voter theorem': the ideal point of the median voter, and the minimum feasible level of rent, are the unique outcomes in any strong Nash equilibrium. We then introduce alternative refinements that are less restrictive. In particular, Ideologically Loyal Coalition-proof equilibrium also leads uniquely to the median outcome.

Debate over Fair Value Accounting: Should we allow Politics to take an active role in setting accounting standards or should we trust that the SEC knows best?

In light of the recent economic downfall, there has been significant media coverage on the topic of fair value accounting. There are many critics of the accounting rule, who place blame on it for the destruction of billions of dollars in capital between financial institutions. Other commentators, however, see the rule as necessary and applaud its ability to bring the turmoil in the economy into the spotlight promptly so that it could be addressed effectively. This paper will begin by conducting a study of fair-value accounting from its inception in previous standards and then follow it through to Statement No. 157. I will then discuss the SEC’s most recent study of FAS157 and their decision as a result of the study.