A Comparison of Two-Market Bertrand Duopoly and Two-Market Cournot Duopoly

In a two-market Bertrand duopoly,each of two firms chooses one of two markets and a price in that market. All four choices are made simultaneously. In a two-market Cournot duopoly, the firms choose quantities rather than prices.It is well known that in the one-market case the threat of price undercutting means that Bertrand equilibrium prices and profits will be lower and quantities higher than Cournot equilibrium prices, profits and quantities.We find a quite different consequence of price undercutting in two-market duopoly. In the two-market case the threat of price undercutting means that Bertrand equilibria are in continuous mixed strategies, while every Cournot duopoly has an equilibrium in pure strategies, or in strategies that are pure in each market.

Minimizing the Price of Tranquility: How to Discourage Scotland's Secession from the United Kingdom

What some view as overly-generous funding of the Scottish parliament results from Scotland.s credible threat to secede from the United Kingdom. Scotland is shown to benefit from a second mover advantage in a non-cooperative sequential game over the allocation of public funds. Various reform proposals are criticized for not recognizing that reform of Scottish government finances must be consistent with Scotland.s credible threat. Fiscal autonomy -- in which the Scottish parliament finances a much greater proportion of its spending from Scottish-sourced taxes, is demonstrated to be a viable reform within the existing political context and, in some circumstances, could remove Scotland.s second mover advantage. We also use a cooperative bargaining game model to demonstrate that an Australian style grants commission would not be a viable reform in the British context.

On the Existence and Characterization of Markovian Equilibrium in Models with Simple Non-Paternalistic Altruism

This paper provides sufficient conditions for existence of Markovian equilibrium in models with non-paternalistic altruism extending to one generation ahead. When utility is non-separable, we show that each equilibrium savings policy correspondence is increasing everywhere and single-valued, except perhaps on a countable number of points. It is also upper hemi-continuous where it is single valued. When utility is separable, we show that the equilibrium is unique, increasing, and continuous, and we provide an algorithm converging uniformly to the equilibrium.

Stationary Markovian Equilibrium in Overlapping Generation Models with Stochastic Nonclassical Production

This paper provides new sufficient conditions for the existence, computation via successive approximations, and stability of Markovian equilibrium decision processes for a large class of OLG models with stochastic nonclassical production. Our notion of stability is existence of stationary Markovian equilibrium. With a nonclassical production, our economies encompass a large class of OLG models with public policy, valued fiat money, production externalities, and Markov shocks to production. Our approach combines aspects of both topological and order theoretic fixed point theory, and provides the basis of globally stable numerical iteration procedures for computing extremal Markovian equilibrium objects. In addition to new theoretical results on existence and computation, we provide some monotone comparative statics results on the space of economies.