Capital Accumulation in the Presence of Informal Credit Contracts: Does the Incentive Mechanism Work Better than Credit Rationing Under Asymmetric Information?

Credit markets with asymmetric information often prefer credit rationing as a profit maximizing device. This paper asks whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing, that is, whether it can alleviate the impact of asymmetric information based on the available information. We used a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogenous agents to assess this. Using Indian credit market data our study shows that the presence of informal credit market can reduce the cost of credit rationing by separating high risk firms from the low risk firms in the informal market. But even after this improvement, the steady state capital accumulation is still much lower as compared to incentive based market clearing rates. Through self revelation of each firm's type, based on the incentive mechanism, banks can diversify their risk by achieving a separating equilibrium in the loan market. The incentive mechanism helps banks to increase capital accumulation in the long run by charging lower rates and lending relatively higher amount to the less risky firms. Another important finding of this study is that self-revelation leads to very significant welfare improvement, as measured by consumptiuon equivalence.

Validation of a Spatially Continuous EDEN Water-Surface Model for the Everglades, Florida

The Everglades Depth Estimation Network (EDEN) is an integrated network of realtime water-level monitoring, ground-elevation modeling, and water-surface modeling that provides scientists and managers with current (2000-present), online water-stage and water-depth information for the entire freshwater portion of the Greater Everglades. Continuous daily spatial interpolations of the EDEN network stage data are presented on grid with 400-square-meter spacing. EDEN offers a consistent and documented dataset that can be used by scientists and managers to: (1) guide large-scale field operations, (2) integrate hydrologic and ecological responses, and (3) support biological and ecological assessments that measure ecosystem responses to the implementation of the Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1999). The target users are biologists and ecologists examining trophic level responses to hydrodynamic changes in the Everglades. The first objective of this report is to validate the spatially continuous EDEN water-surface model for the Everglades, Florida developed by Pearlstine et al. (2007) by using an independent field-measured data-set. The second objective is to demonstrate two applications of the EDEN water-surface model: to estimate site-specific ground elevation by using the validated EDEN water-surface model and observed water depth data; and to create water-depth hydrographs for tree islands. We found that there are no statistically significant differences between model-predicted and field-observed water-stage data in both southern Water Conservation Area (WCA) 3A and WCA 3B. Tree island elevations were derived by subtracting field water-depth measurements from the predicted EDEN water-surface. Water-depth hydrographs were then computed by subtracting tree island elevations from the EDEN water stage. Overall, the model is reliable by a root mean square error (RMSE) of 3.31 cm. By region, the RMSE is 2.49 cm and 7.77 cm in WCA 3A and 3B, respectively. This new landscape-scale hydrological model has wide applications for ongoing research and management efforts that are vital to restoration of the Florida Everglades. The accurate, high-resolution hydrological data, generated over broad spatial and temporal scales by the EDEN model, provides a previously missing key to understanding the habitat requirements and linkages among native and invasive populations, including fish, wildlife, wading birds, and plants. The EDEN model is a powerful tool that could be adapted for other ecosystem-scale restoration and management programs worldwide.

Lease Defaults and the Efficient Mitigation of Damages

The traditional law of leases imposed no duty on landlords to mitigate damages in the event of tenant breach, whereas the modern law of leases does. An economic model of leases, in which absentee tenants may or may not intend to breach, shows that the traditional rule promotes tenant investment in the property by discouraging landlord entry. In contrast, the modern rule prevents the property from being left idle by encouraging landlords to enter and re-let abandoned property. The model reflects the historic use of the traditional rule for agricultural leases, where absentee use was valuable, and the emergence of the modern rule for residential leases, where the primary use entails continuous occupation.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.

A Universal Formula for Continuous Utility

A single formula assigns a continuous utility function to every representable preference relation.

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition.

Continuous Paretian Preferences

Two forms of continuity are defined for Pareto representations of preferences. They are designated continuity and coordinate continuity. Characterizations are given of those Pareto representable preferences that are continuously representable and, in dimension two, of those that are coordinate-continuously representable.