From Books to the Web: A Comparative Analysis of Holocaust Denial in the Internet Age

An analysis of print Holocaust denial literature as it compares to internet Holocaust denial, with a focus on how the transition from print literature to the internet has affected Holocaust denial.

From Truth to Justice: How Does Amnesty Factor In? A Comparative Analysis of South Africa and Sierra Leone's Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (TRC) have emerged in the last few decades as a mechanism for a state to overcome widespread, grave, human rights violations. There are numerous approaches to a TRC all with an ultimate goal: that formerly warring factions, perpetrators, witnesses, and victims can move forward as a united people. I propose that the provision of amnesty is critical to the success of a TRC. I hypothesize that the form of amnesty chosen (i.e. blanket v. conditional amnesty) determines the revelation of truth and realization of justice, which in turn dictates whether a TRC can achieve reconciliation. To test this hypothesis, I use two case studies: South Africa, which has utilized conditional amnesty, and Sierra Leone which has employed blanket amnesty. I create a model for measuring reconciliation. I can then look at the implications of both types of amnesty and assess which, in the end, is more effective. My overarching conclusion is that the provision of conditional amnesty is more effective than blanket amnesty in achieving reconciliation. Ultimately, I hope that this conclusion can be generalized to other TRCs.

Endogenous Growth in the Presence of Informal Credit Markets: A Comparative Analysis Between Credit Rationing and Self-Revelation Regimes

This paper examines whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing in terms of growth. In a dynamic general equilibrium framework, we assume that firms are heterogenous with different degrees of risk and households invest in human capital development. With the help of Indian household level data we show that the informal market reduces the cost of rationing by increasing the growth rate by 0.7 percent. This higher growth rate, in the presence of an informal sector, is due to the ability of the informal market to separate the high risk from the low risk firms thanks to better information. But even after such improvement we do not get the optimum outcome. The findings, based on our second question, suggest that the revelation of firms' type, based on incentive compatible pricing, can lead to almost 2 percent higher growth rate as compared to the credit rationing regime with informal sector.