2 resultados para Collective bargaining.

em University of Connecticut - USA


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Recently, some industries have collectively agreed not to produce models that do not meet an energy efficiency (and hence an environmental) standard. This paper presents a simple model that can be used to examine a voluntary collective agreement to limit or completely eliminate the low efficiency model of a given product (e.g., a low efficiency washing machine). We show that, when there is competition between firms, a collective agreement to limit or even eliminate production of the polluting model can actually increase profits for all firms in the industry. This suggests that a collective agreement of this type might actually be beneficial to firms, while at the same time improving environmental quality. However, the implicit enforcement that comes from the public nature of the commitment is necessary to ensure this outcome. This suggests that, by promoting such agreements, policymakers may be able to achieve substantial environmental gains with relatively little inducement. The impact on social welfare will then depend on whether these gains are sufficiently large to offset consumer losses from reductions in product variety and the associated price increases.

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The holdout problem is commonly cited as the justification for eminent domain, but the nature of the problem is not well understood. This paper models the holdout problem in a bargaining framework, where a developer seeks to acquire several parcels of land for a large-scale development. We show that in the absence of eminent domain, holdouts are inevitable, threatening costly delay. However, if the developer has the power to use eminent domain to acquire the land from holdouts, all sellers will bargain, thus avoiding delay. An offsetting cost is that owners may negotiate prices below their true value, possibly resulting in excessive transfer of land to the developer.