Shadow Profit Maximization and a Generalized Measure of Inefficiency

Determining the profit maximizing input-output bundle of a firm requires data on prices. This paper shows how endogenously determined shadow prices can be used in place of actual prices to obtain the optimal input-output bundle where the firm.s shadow profit is maximized. This approach amounts to an application of the Weak Axiom of Profit Maximization (WAPM) formulated by Varian (1984) based on shadow prices rather than actual prices. At these prices the shadow profit of a firm is zero. Thus, the maximum profit that could have been attained at some other input-output bundle is a measure of the inefficiency of the firm. Because the benchmark input-output bundle is always an observed bundle from the data, it can be determined without having to solve any elaborate programming problem. An empirical application to U.S. airlines data illustrates the proposed methodology.

A Model of Rights

In this paper, we develop a simple model of the rights a government provides its citizenry. Rights are treated as public goods and taken as primitives in agents utility functions; each agent has preferences over the entire policy vector. We model the interaction among citi-zens and the government as a game in which an exogenous lobbying set makes contributions to the government to in uence policy formu-lation in the matter of rights. When examining contribution schedules comprising truthful Nash strategies, we find that members of the lob-bying set obtain rights closer to their most-preferred bundle, while the rights of non-lobbyers further diverge from their most-preferred bun-dle. Further, if the lobbying set comprises the entire population, the government s allocation of rights does not differ from the allocation achieved in the absence of contributions.

Does the Presence of Surplus Labor Hinder Production in Indian Manufacturing?

Input congestion occurs at a given input bundle when the assumption of free disposability of inputs does not hold and an increase in input leads to a decline in output. In this paper we employ the nonparametric method of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to examine the question on input congestion with respect to labor, using state level data from the Annual Survey of Industries for the period 1986-87 through 1999-2000. When the standard assumption of strong disposability is relaxed for the labor inputs, the nonparametric analysis of state-level data from Indian manufacturing shows considerable measure of labor input congestion. While in selected states congestion comes from non-production workers as well, the principal source of labor congestion is production labor. There is no evidence that the problem of labor congestion has become less severe during the post-Reform years. It appears that market forces without any major institutional changes in enforcement of labor discipline cannot eliminate congestion.

Comparing Input- and Output-Oriented Measures of Technical Efficiency to Determine Local Returns to Scale in DEA Models

This paper shows how one can infer the nature of local returns to scale at the input- or output-oriented efficient projection of a technically inefficient input-output bundle, when the input- and output-oriented measures of efficiency differ.

Property Law

This chapter examines the economics of property rights and property law. Property law is a fundamental part of social organization and is also fundamental to the operation of the economy because it defines and protects the bundle of rights that constitute property. Property law thereby creates incentives to protect and invest in assets and establishes a legal framework within which market exchange of assets can take place. The purpose of this chapter is to show how the economics of property rights can be used to understand fundamental features of property law and related extra-legal institutions. The chapter will both examine the rationale for legal doctrine and the effects of legal doctrine regarding the exercise, enforcement, and transfer of rights. It will also examine various property rights regimes including open access, private ownership, common property and state property. The guiding questions are: How are property rights established? What explains the variation in the types of property rights? What governs the use and transfer of rights? And, how are property rights enforced?

Are Some Indian Bank Too Large? A Examination of Size Efficiency in Indian Banking

In this paper we use data from the years 1997 through 2003 to evaluate the size efficiency of Indian banks. Following Maindiratta (1990) we consider a bank to be too large if breaking it up into a number of smaller units would result in a larger output bundle than what could be produced from the same input by a single bank. When this is the case, the bank is not size efficient. Our analysis shows that many of the banks are, in deed, too large in various years. We also find that often a bank is operating in the region of diminishing returns to scale but is not a candidate for break up.