Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information

In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

The Economic Case for Fiscal Federalism in Scotland

In this paper we consider the case for assigning tax revenues to Scotland, by which we mean that taxes levied on Scottish tax bases should be returned to the Scottish budget. The budget, however, would continue to be supplemented by transfers from the Westminster budget. This arrangement differs from the current situation whereby public spending is largely financed by a bloc grant from Westminster. Our suggestion falls short of full fiscal federalism for Scotland . meaning that Scotland had control over choice of tax base and of tax rates, and fiscal transfers from Westminster would be minimal. We use propositions drawn from the theory of fiscal federalism to argue for a smaller vertical imbalance between taxes retained in Scotland and public spending in Scotland. A closer matching of spending with taxes would better signal to beneficiaries the true costs of public spending in terms of taxes raised. It would also create more complete incentives for politicians to provide public goods and services in quantities and at qualities that voters are actually willing to pay for. Under the current bloc grant system, the marginal tax cost of spending does not enter into political agents. calculations as spending is out of a fixed total budget. Moreover, the Scottish electorate is hindered in signaling its desire for local public goods and services since the size of the total budget is determined by a rigid formula set by Westminster. At the present time we reject proposals for full fiscal federalism because in sharply reducing vertical imbalance in the Scottish budget, it is likely to worsen horizontal balance between Scotland and the other UK regions. Horizontal balance occurs where similarly situated regions enjoy the same per capita level of public goods and services at the same per capita tax cost. The complete removal of the bloc grant under full fiscal federalism would remove the mechanism that currently promotes horizontal equity in the UK. Variability in own-source tax revenues creates other problems with full fiscal federalism. Taxes derived from North Sea oil would constitute a large proportion of Scottish taxes, but these are known to be volatile in the face of variable oil prices and the pound-dollar exchange rate. At the present time variability in oil tax revenue is absorbed by Westminster. Scotland is insulated through the bloc grant. This risk sharing mechanism would be lost with full fiscal federalism. It is true that Scotland could turn to financial markets to tide itself over oil tax revenue downturns, but as a much smaller and less diversified financial entity than the UK as a whole it would probably have to borrow on less favorable terms than can Westminster. Scotland would have to bear this extra cost itself. Also, with full fiscal federalism it is difficult to see how the Scottish budget could be used as a macroeconomic stabilizer. At present, tax revenue downturns in Scotland - together with the steady bloc grant - are absorbed through an increase in vertical imbalance. This acts as an automatic stabilizer for the Scottish economy. No such mechanism would exist under full fiscal federalism. The borrowing alternative would still exist but on the less favorable terms - as with borrowing to finance oil tax shortfalls.

Tiebout Choice and the Voucher

This paper examines who is likely to gain and who is likely to lose under a universal voucher program. Following Epple and Romano (1998, 2003), and Nechyba (2000, 2003a), we focus on the idea that gains and losses under a universal voucher depend on two effects: changes in peer group composition and changes in housing values. We show that the direction and magnitude of each of these effects hinges critically on market structure, i.e., the amount of school choice that already exists in the public sector. In markets with little or no Tiebout choice, potential changes in peer group composition create an incentive for high-socioeconomic (SES) households to vote for the voucher and for low-SES households to vote against voucher. In contrast, in markets with significant Tiebout choice, potential changes in housing values create an incentive for high-SES households to vote against the voucher and for low-SES households to vote for the voucher. Using data on vote outcomes from California's 2000 voucher initiative, we find evidence consistent with those predictions.

The Value of Waiting: Foreign Direct Investment with Uncertainty and Imperfect Local Knowledge

This paper examines the role of uncertainty and imperfect local knowledge in foreign direct investment. The main idea comes from the literature on investment under uncertainty, such as Pindyck (1991) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). We empirically test .the value of waiting. with a dataset on foreign direct investment (FDI). Many factors (e.g., political and economic regulations) as well as uncertainty and the risks due to imperfect local knowledge, determine the attractiveness of FDI. The uncertainty and irreversibility of FDI links the time interval between permission and actual execution of such FDI with explanatory variables, including information on foreign (home) countries and domestic industries. Common factors, such as regulatory change and external shocks, may affect the uncertainty when foreign investors make irreversible FDI decisions. We derive testable hypotheses from models of investment under uncertainty to determine those possible factors that induce delays in FDI, using Korean data over 1962 to 2001.