An Experimental Study of Complex-Offer Auctions: Payment Cost Minimization vs. Offer Cost Minimization

A Payment Cost Minimization (PCM) auction has been proposed as an alternative to the Offer Cost Minimization (OCM) auction to be used in wholesale electric power markets with the intention to lower the procurement cost of electricity. Efficiency concerns about this proposal have relied on the assumption of true production cost revelation. Using an experimental approach, I compare the two auctions, strictly controlling for the level of unilateral market power. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. I find that both auctions result in start-up fees that are significantly higher than the start-up costs. Overall, the two auctions perform similarly in terms of procurement cost and efficiency. Surprisingly, I do not find a substantial difference between less market power and more market power designs. Both designs result in similar inefficiencies and equally higher procurement costs over the competitive prediction. The PCM auction tends to have lower price volatility than the OCM auction when the market power is minimal but this property vanishes in the designs with market power. These findings lead me to conclude that both the PCM and the OCM auctions do not belong to the class of truth revealing mechanisms and do not easily elicit competitive behavior.

Equilibria with Local Governments and Commuting: Income Sorting vs. Income Mixing

Tiebout's (1956) model of fiscal competition suggests income sorting between jurisdictions while the Alonso (1964), Mills (167) and Muth (1969) model of the monocentric city suggests income sorting over space. However, strict income sorting is not empirically observed. We add fiscal competition to the spatial model by considering a circular inner city surrounded by a suburb. The fiscal difference between the jurisdictions and the commuting advantage of locations closer to the city center are capitalized into house prices. In addition to the traditional equilibrium with income sorting, there are equilibria with income mixing - both across jurisdictions and across space.

Online Format vs. Live Mode of Instruction: Do Human Capital Differences or Differences in Returns to Human Capital Explain the Differences in Outcomes?

Our paper asks the question: Does mode of instruction format (live or online format) effect test scores in the principles of macroeconomics classes? Our data are from several sections of principles of macroeconomics, some in live format, some in online format, and all taught by the same instructor. We find that test scores for the online format, when corrected for sample selection bias, are four points higher than for the live format, and the difference is statistically significant. One possible explanation for this is that there was slightly higher human capital in the classes that had the online format. A Oaxaca decomposition of this difference in grades was conducted to see how much was due to human capital and how much was due to the differences in the rates of return to human capital. This analysis reveals that 25% of the difference was due to the higher human capital with the remaining 75% due to differences in the returns to human capital. It is possible that for the relatively older student with the appropriate online learning skill set, and with schedule constrains created by family and job, the online format provides them with a more productive learning environment than does the alternative traditional live class format. Also, because our data are limited to the student s academic transcript, we recommend future research include data on learning style characteristics, and the constraints formed by family and job choices.

Efficiency in Deregulated Electricity Markets: Offer Cost Minimization vs. Payment Cost Minimization Auction

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the efficiency performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed mechanism. The analysis highlights the importance of considering strategic behavior when comparing different institutional systems. We find that in concentrated markets, neither auction mechanism can guarantee an efficient allocation. The advantage of the current mechanism increases with increased price competition if market demand is perfectly inelastic. However, if market demand has some responsiveness to price, the superiority of the current auction with respect to efficiency is not that obvious. We present a case where the proposed auction outperforms the current mechanism on efficiency even if all offers reflect true production costs. We also find that a market designer might face a choice problem with a tradeoff between lower electricity cost and production efficiency. Some implications for social welfare are discussed as well.

Simple-Offer vs. Complex-Offer Auctions in Deregulated Electricity Markets

In my recent experimental research of wholesale electricity auctions, I discovered that the complex structure of the offers leaves a lot of room for strategic behavior, which consequently leads to anti- competitive and inefficient outcomes in the market. A specific feature of these complex-offer auctions is that the sellers submit not only the quantities and the minimum prices at which they are willing to sell, but also the start-up fees that are designed to reimburse the fixed start-up costs of the generation plants. In this paper, using the experimental method I compare the performance of two complex-offer auctions (COAs) against the performance of a simple-offer auction (SOA), in which the sellers have to recover all their generation costs --- fixed and variable ---through a uniform market-clearing price. I find that the SOA significantly reduces consumer prices and lowers price volatility. It mitigates anti-competitive effects that are present in the COAs and achieves allocative efficiency more quickly.

Student Performance in Traditional vs. Online Format: Evidence from an MBA Level Introductory Economics Class

All previous studies comparing online and face-to-face format for instruction of economics compared courses that were either online or face-to-face format and regressed exam scores on selected student characteristics. This approach is subject to the econometric problems of self-selection omitted unobserved variables. Our study uses two methods to deal with these problems. First we eliminate self-selection bias by using students from a course that uses both instruction formats. Second, we use the exam questions as the unit of observation, and eliminate omitted variable bias by using an indicator variable for each student to capture the effect of differences in unobserved student characteristics on learning outcomes. We report the finding that students had a significantly greater chance of answering a question correctly if it came from a chapter covered online.