The Framework of Trade in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

This paper establishes an overview of the variables and constraints that affected trade in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. It explores the origins of COMECON, the demographic and resource distribution of the member nations, and the role of trade in a centrally planned economy. The paper’s primary focus is on the emergence of a bilateral trade structure, the faulty price mechanism, and the nonconvertibility of currencies. The paper documents the origins and relationships between the constraints of trade within COMECON, and argues that ultimately, these constraints prevented COMECON from fully achieving its economic objectives.

The Effects of Trade Orientation and Human Capital on Total Factor Productivity

We study the effects of trade orientation and human capital on total factor productivity for a pooled cross-section, time-series sample of developed and developing countries. We first estimate total factor productivity from a parsimonious specification of the aggregate production function involving output per worker, capital per worker, and the labor force, both with and without the stock of human capital. Then we consider a number of potential determinants of total factor productivity growth including several measures of trade orientation as well as a measure of human capital. We find that a high degree of openness benefits total factor productivity and that human capital contributes to total factor productivity only after our measure of openness passes some threshold level. Before that threshold, increases in human capital actually depress total factor productivity. Finally, we also consider the issue of convergence of real GDP per worker and total factor productivity, finding more evidence of convergence for the latter than for the former.

For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems

We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favors industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. tariff data from 1993, and House campaign contribution data from two electoral cycles. We find evidence of a protectionist bias due to majoritarian system politics that is comparable in magnitude to the payoff from being an organized industry.

Do Labor Market Imperfections Increase Trade Protection? A Theoretical Investigation

Labor market imperfections are commonly believed to be a major reason for imposing trade impediments. In this paper, I introduce labor market rigidities that are prevalent in continental European countries into the well-known protection for sale model proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). I show that contrary to commonly held views, imperfections in the labor market do not necessarily increase equilibrium trade protection. A testable equilibrium trade protection equation is also derived. The findings in this paper are hence particularly relevant for empirical tests of trade policy determinants in economies with more regulated labor markets.