6 resultados para Bank fragility
em University of Connecticut - USA
Resumo:
The aggregate performance of the banking industry depends on the underlying microlevel dynamics within that industry. adjustments within banks, reallocations between banks, entries of new banks, and exits of existing banks. This paper develops a generalized ideal dynamic decomposition and applies it to the return on equity of foreign and domestic commercial banks in Korea from 1994 to 2000. The sample corresponds to the Asian financial crisis and the final stages of a long process of deregulation and privatization in the Korean banking industry. The comparison of our findings reveals that the overall performance of Korean banks largely reflects individual bank efficiencies, except immediately after the Asian financial crisis where restructuring played a more important role on average bank performance. Moreover, Korean regional banks started the restructuring process about one year before the Korean nationwide banks. Foreign bank performance, however, largely reflected individual bank efficiencies, even immediately after the Asian financial crisis.
Resumo:
This paper examines the effects of geographical deregulation on commercial bank performance across states. We reach some general conclusions. First, the process of deregulation on an intrastate and interstate basis generally improves bank profitability and performance. Second, the macroeconomic variables -- the unemployment rate and real personal income per capita -- and the average interest rate affect bank performance as much, or more, than the process of deregulation. Finally, while deregulation toward full interstate banking and branching may produce more efficient banks and a healthier banking system, we find mixed results on this issue.
Resumo:
Despite the extensive work on currency mismatches, research on the determinants and effects of maturity mismatches is scarce. In this paper I show that emerging market maturity mismatches are negatively affected by capital inflows and price volatilities. Furthermore, I find that banks with low maturity mismatches are more profitable during crisis periods but less profitable otherwise. The later result implies that banks face a tradeoff between higher returns and risk, hence channeling short term capital into long term loans is caused by cronyism and implicit guarantees rather than the depth of the financial market. The positive relationship between maturity mismatches and price volatility, on the other hand, shows that the banks of countries with high exchange rate and interest rate volatilities can not, or choose not to hedge themselves. These results follow from a panel regression on a data set I constructed by merging bank level data with aggregate data. This is advantageous over traditional studies which focus only on aggregate data.
Resumo:
Significant numbers of U.S. commercial bank failures in the late 1980s and early 1990s raise important questions about bank performance. We develop a failure-prediction model for Connecticut banks to examine events in 1991 and 1992. We adopt data envelopment analysis to derive measures of managerial efficiency. Our findings can be briefly stated. Managerial inefficiency does not provide significant information to explain Connecticut bank failures. Portfolio variables do generally contain significant information.
Resumo:
Regulatory change not seen since the Great Depression swept the U.S. banking industry beginning in the early 1980s, culminating with the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994. Significant consolidations have occurred in the banking industry. This paper considers the market-power versus the efficient-structure theories of the positive correlation between banking concentration and performance on a state-by-state basis. Temporal causality tests imply that bank concentration leads bank profitability, supporting the market-power, rather than the efficient-structure, theory of that positive correlation. Our finding suggests that bank regulators, by focusing on local banking markets, missed the initial stages of an important structural change at the state level.
Resumo:
In this paper we use data from the years 1997 through 2003 to evaluate the size efficiency of Indian banks. Following Maindiratta (1990) we consider a bank to be too large if breaking it up into a number of smaller units would result in a larger output bundle than what could be produced from the same input by a single bank. When this is the case, the bank is not size efficient. Our analysis shows that many of the banks are, in deed, too large in various years. We also find that often a bank is operating in the region of diminishing returns to scale but is not a candidate for break up.