Efficient Unit Root Tests of real Exchange Rates in the Post-Bretton Woods Era

We apply the efficient unit-roots tests of Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996), and Elliott (1998) to twenty-one real exchange rates using monthly data of the G-7 countries from the post-Bretton Woods floating exchange rate period. Our results indicate that, for eighteen out of the twenty-one real exchange rates, the null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 10% significance level or better using the Elliot et al (1996) DF-GLS test. The unit-root null hypothesis is also rejected for one additional real exchange rate when we allow for one endogenously determined break in the time series of the real exchange rate as in Perron (1997). In all, we find favorable evidence to support long-run purchasing power parity in nineteen out of twenty-one real exchange rates. Second, we find no strong evidence to suggest that the use of non-U.S. dollar-based real exchange rates tend to produce more favorable result for long-run PPP than the use of U.S. dollar-based real exchange rates as Lothian (1998) has concluded.

Non-Parametric Tests of Real Exchange rates in the Post-Bretton Woods Era

This paper examines the mean-reverting property of real exchange rates. Earlier studies have generally not been able to reject the null hypothesis of a unit-root in real exchange rates, especially for the post-Bretton Woods floating period. The results imply that long-run purchasing power parity does not hold. More recent studies, especially those using panel unit-root tests, have found more favorable results, however. But, Karlsson and Löthgren (2000) and others have recently pointed out several potential pitfalls of panel unit-root tests. Thus, the panel unit-root test results are suggestive, but they are far from conclusive. Moreover, consistent individual country time series evidence that supports long-run purchasing power parity continues to be scarce. In this paper, we test for long memory using Lo's (1991) modified rescaled range test, and the rescaled variance test of Giraitis, Kokoszka, Leipus, and Teyssière (2003). Our testing procedure provides a non-parametric alternative to the parametric tests commonly used in this literature. Our data set consists of monthly observations from April 1973 to April 2001 of the G-7 countries in the OECD. Our two tests find conflicting results when we use U.S. dollar real exchange rates. However, when non-U.S. dollar real exchange rates are used, we find only two cases out of fifteen where the null hypothesis of an unit-root with short-term dependence can be rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis of long-term dependence using the modified rescaled range test, and only one case when using the rescaled variance test. Our results therefore provide a contrast to the recent favorable panel unit-root test results.

International Money and Finance

We discuss the effectiveness of pegged exchange rate regimes from an historical perspective, drawing conclusions for their effectiveness today. Starting with the classical gold standard period, we point out that a succession of pegged regimes have ended in failure; except for the first, which was ended by the outbreak of World War I, all of the others we discuss have been ended by adverse economic developments for which the regimes themselves were partly responsible. Prior to World War II the main problem was a shortage of monetary gold that we argue is implicated as a cause of the Great Depression. After World War II, more particularly from the late-1960s, the main problem has been a surfeit of the main international reserve asset, the US dollar. This has led to generalized inflation in the 1970s and into the 1980s. Today, excessive dollar international base money creation is again a problem that could have serious consequences for world economic stability.

Economic Rights, Human Development Effort and Institutions

This paper focuses on the link between economic rights and institutions. Simple analysis of data is used to demonstrate countries' human development effort in advancing economics rights of the citizens. A country's human development effort is evaluated on the basis of the well-being of the poorest members of the society. An analysis of data reveals that there is a wide variation in countries' pro-poor stance. While it is accepted that positive rights are pro-poor, this paper argues that so too are negative economic rights and in fact the two are complements rather than substitutes. Classifying countries into human development income deficit and human development effort deficit, it is demonstrated that a large number of countries could achieve higher welfare levels for the poor if they improved on bother positive and negative economic rights. The paper attempts to explain variations in the observed commitment to economic rights by focusing on pro-poor institutions. The basic thesis advanced in the paper is that pro-poor policies are more likely to be implemented and sustained in those institutions where power is sufficiently diffused such that even the poor have leverage over policy outcomes. The paper focuses on how institutions impact on power diffusion and therefore the adoption of pro-poor growth and policies. The failure of countries to adopt pro-poor growth and policies is attributed to institutional failures manifested in concentration of power. The policy recommendations emanating from the analysis focus on institutional reforms to enhance power diffusion. These policies include enlarging the political space through democratization, strengthening institutions and capacity to fight corruption and improve transparency, and bringing the government closer to the people through appropriate design and implementation of decentralization schemes. Some recent examples of improvements in economic rights following power diffusion are provided.