A Principal-Agent Model of Contracting in Major League Baseball

Traditional economic analyses of the reserve clause in major league baseball view it as having arisen from the superior bargaining of owners compared to players. This article interprets it instead as promoting efficient investment by teams in player development, given the transferability of player skills to other teams. Using a principal-agent framework, the article shows that limited player mobility emerges as part of the optimal contract between players (principals) and teams (agents).

Contractual Difficulties in Environmental Management and the Protection of Biodiversity: The Case of Conservation and Mitigation Banking

This paper offers a principal-agent model of feasible private contracting in mitigation and conservation banking aimed at the protection of natural habitat and bio-diversity of US wetlands and uplands. It is shown that while it is straightforward to design an incentive contract, such a contract may not achieve the federally mandated objective of no net loss of habitat. This is because the minimum payment required as an economic incentive to private agents may be greater than what they should receive for the habitat values that they actually created in the field. This possible problem is shown to derive from nonconvexity in the production possibility set between the biological value of land as natural habitat and in non-habitat uses such as in urban development. The paper concludes with a consideration of several institutional devises that may promote the convergence of private contracting and the attainment of no net loss. These include the payment of subsidies, greater accuracy in the identification of actual quality by the principal, and the use of several incentive alignment devises.

Salvaging Historic Shipwrecks

The salvage of historic shipwrecks involves a debate between profit-oriented salvagers, who wish to maximize profit, and archeologists, who wish to maximize historical value. We use a principal-agent model to derive the optimal reward scheme for salvagers, including a minimum duty of care in conducting the salvage operation. A review of U.S. and international law suggests that, while there is an emerging recognition of the need to devote greater care to salvaging those wrecks that are located, current doctrines provide inadequate incentives to locate historic wrecks in the first place.

Liquidity Constraint and Child Labor In India: Is Market Really Incapable Of Eradicating It From Wage-Labor Households?

One way to measure the lower steady state equilibrium outcome in human capital development is the incidence of child labor in most of the developing countries. With the help of Indian household level data in an overlapping generation framework, we show that production loans under credit rationing are not optimally extended towards firms because of issues with adverse selection. More stringent rationing in the credit market creates a distortion in the labor market by increasing adult wage rate and the demand for child labor. Lower availability of funds under stringent rationing coupled with increased demand for loans induces the high risk firms to replace adult labor by child labor. A switch of regime from credit rationing to revelation regime can clear such imperfections in the labor market. The equilibrium higher wage rate elevates the household consumption to a significantly higher level than the subsistence under credit rationing and therefore higher level of human capital development is assured leading to no supply of child labor.

A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities

Credit-rationing model similar to Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] is combined with the information externality model of Lang and Nakamura [1993] to examine the properties of mortgage markets characterized by both adverse selection and information externalities. In a credit-rationing model, additional information increases lenders ability to distinguish risks, which leads to increased supply of credit. According to Lang and Nakamura, larger supply of credit leads to additional market activities and therefore, greater information. The combination of these two propositions leads to a general equilibrium model. This paper describes properties of this general equilibrium model. The paper provides another sufficient condition in which credit rationing falls with information. In that, external information improves the accuracy of equity-risk assessments of properties, which reduces credit rationing. Contrary to intuition, this increased accuracy raises the mortgage interest rate. This allows clarifying the trade offs associated with reduced credit rationing and the quality of applicant pool.

The Problem with Utility: Towards a Non-Consequentialist / Utility Theory Synthesis

I develop the argument that our current decision-making framework, utility theory, when used by itself, is 1) descriptively incomplete, 2) theoretically flawed, and 2) ethically questionable. In response, I offer an exploratory framework that incorporates both consequentialist and non-consequentialist motivations. Adding a commitment function provides a synthesis which remedies the problems associated with the sole use of utility theory. Finally, I show how philosophers Immanuel Kant, W.D. Ross, and Martin Buber provide an ethical basis for the framework.