Bursting Boilers and the Federal Power Redux: The Evolution of Safety on the Western Rivers

Using newly constructed data series on explosions, deaths, and steamboat traffic, we examine econometrically the causes of increased safety in steamboat boilers in the nineteenth century. Although the law of 1852 (but not that of 1838) did have a dramatic initial effect in reducing explosions, that reduction came against the background not of a system out of control but of a system that from the beginning was steadily increasing boiler safety per person- mile. The role of the federal government in conducting and disseminating basic research on boiler technology may have been more significant for increased safety than its explicit regulatory efforts.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the central bank should adopt a loss function that differs from the social loss function. Carefully designing the central bank s loss function with consistent targets can harmonize optimal and consistent policy. This desirable result emerges from two observations. First, the social loss function reflects a normative process that does not necessarily prove consistent with the structure of the microeconomy. Thus, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Second, an optimal loss function for the central bank must depend on the structure of that microeconomy. In addition, this paper shows that control theory provides a benchmark for institution design in a game-theoretical framework.

Expression of Imprinted Genes Is Aberrant in Deceased Newborn Cloned Calves and Relatively Normal in Surviving Adult Clones

Cattle are the species used most frequently for the development of assisted reproductive technologies, such as nuclear transfer. Cattle cloning can be performed by a large number of laboratories around the world, and the efficiency of nuclear transfer in cattle is the highest among all species in which successful cloning has been achieved. However, an understanding of the expression of imprinted genes in this important species is lacking. In the present study, real time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) was utilized to quantify the expression of the bovine Igf2, Igf2r, and H19 genes in eight major organs (brain, bladder, heart, kidney, liver, lung, spleen, and thymus) of somatic cell cloned calves that died shortly after birth, in three tissues (skin, muscle, and liver) of healthy clones that survived to adulthood, and in corresponding tissues of control animals from natural reproduction. We found that, deceased bovine cloned calves exhibited abnormal expression of all three genes studied in various organs. Large variations in the expression levels of imprinted genes were also seen among these clones, which were produced from the same genetic donor. In surviving adult clones, however, the expression of these imprinted genes was largely normal, except for the expression of the Igf2 gene in muscle, which was highly variable. Our data showed disruptions of expression of imprinted genes in bovine clones, which is possibly due to incomplete reprogramming of donor cell nuclei during nuclear transfer, and these abnormalities may be associated with the high neonatal mortality in cloned animals; clones that survived to adulthood, however, are not only physically healthy but also relatively normal at the molecular level of those three imprinted genes.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).