Strategy and Circumstance: the Response of American Firms to Japanese Competition in Semiconductors, 1980-1995

The transistor was an American invention, and American firms led the world in semiconductor production and innovation for the first three decades of that industry's existence. In the 1980s, however, Japanese producers began to challenge American dominance. Shrill cries arose from the literature of public policy, warning that the American semiconductor industry would soon share the fate of the lamented American consumer electronics business. Few dissented from the implications: the only hope for salvation would be to adopt Japanese-style public policies and imitate the kinds of capabilities Japanese firms possessed. But the predicted extinction never occurred. Instead, American firms surged back during the 1990s, and it now seems the Japanese who are embattled. This striking American turnaround has gone largely unremarked upon in the public policy literature. And even scholarship in strategic management, which thrives on stories of success instead of stories of failure, has been comparatively silent. Drawing on a more thorough economic history of the worldwide semiconductor industry (Langlois and Steinmueller 1999), this essay attempts to collect some of the lessons for strategy research of the American resurgence. We argue that, although some of the American response did consist in changing or augmenting capabilities, most of the renewed American success is in fact the result not of imitating superior Japanese capabilities but rather of taking good advantage of a set of capabilities developed in the heyday of American dominance. Serendipity played at least as important a role as did strategy.

Productivity and Market Integration in American Communal Dairying, 1830-1875

In our late twentieth century experience, survival of an economy seems critically dependent on well established rights to private property and a return to labor that rewards greater effort. But that need not be so. History provides examples of micro-socialist economies that internally, at least, allow for little private property for participants and a constant return to labor that is independent of effort. Some such economies may even be termed 'successful,' if success is taken to mean survival over several generations. If these communities survived without conditions that are generally thought to be necessary for success, a question worth asking is how this occurred, for we can then shed some light on what really is necessary for economic survival. Addressing this issue emphasizes the critical role of time, for even if the microsocialist economies that we study here eventually became the merest shadow of their former selves, the fact that they did flourish for so long makes them a valuable counterexample, and hence, a phenomenon in need of explanation. We consider here the dairy industry of the Shakers, which was characterized by intensive efforts to increase productivity, in part through the use of market signals, but efforts that were also limited by the ideological goals of the community. The Shakers were (and are, but since it is the historical Shakers that concern this paper, the past tense will be used) a Christian communal group. Some of their distinctive beliefs included the existence of a male and female Godhead, from which followed sexual equality, and active communication between Believers (a Shaker term for members of the sect) and denizens of the spirit world. Practices of the Society (their official name is the United Society of Believers in Christ's Second Appearing, the second appearing being in the body of their foundress, an illiterate Englishwoman named Ann Lee) included pacifism, celibacy, confession of sins to elders, and joint or communal ownership of the Society's assets. Each Shaker received the same return for his or her labor: room, board, clothing, and the experience of divine proximity in a community of like minded Believers (Stein 1992).

A New Economic Analysis of the American Revolution

We offer an analysis of the American Revolution in which actors are modeled as choosing the sovereign organization that maximizes their net expected benefits. Benefits of secession derive from satisfaction of greed and settlement of grievance. Costs derive from the cost of civil war and lost benefit of Empire membership. When expected net benefits are positive for both secessionists and the Empire civil war ensues, otherwise it is settled or never begins in the first place. The novelty of our discussion is to show how diverse economic and non-economic factors (such as pamphleteering by Thomas Paine and the morale of the Revolutionary forces) can be integrated into a single economic model.