Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information

In the last two decades, trade liberalization under GATT/WTO has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection. Economists have argued convincingly that this is partly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping during the GATT Tokyo Round. The introduction of the cost- based dumping definition gives regulating authorities a better opportunity to choose protection according to their liking. This paper investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework where the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. To induce truthful revelation, the government can design a tariff schedule, contingent on firms' cost reports, accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification (i.e., auditing) and, in case misreporting is detected, to set penalty duties. We show that depending on the concrete assumptions, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeeds in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. In this case, the antidumping framework within GATT/WTO does not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome the informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy.

For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems

We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favors industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. tariff data from 1993, and House campaign contribution data from two electoral cycles. We find evidence of a protectionist bias due to majoritarian system politics that is comparable in magnitude to the payoff from being an organized industry.

Do Labor Market Imperfections Increase Trade Protection? A Theoretical Investigation

Labor market imperfections are commonly believed to be a major reason for imposing trade impediments. In this paper, I introduce labor market rigidities that are prevalent in continental European countries into the well-known protection for sale model proposed by Grossman and Helpman (1994). I show that contrary to commonly held views, imperfections in the labor market do not necessarily increase equilibrium trade protection. A testable equilibrium trade protection equation is also derived. The findings in this paper are hence particularly relevant for empirical tests of trade policy determinants in economies with more regulated labor markets.

Costly Revenue-Raising and the Case for Favoring Import-Competing Industries

A standard finding in the political economy of trade policy literature is that we should expect export-oriented industries to attract more assistance than import-competing industries. In reality, however, trade policy is heavily biased toward supporting import industries. This paper shows within a standard protection for sale framework, how the costliness of raising revenue via taxation makes trade subsidies less desirable and trade taxes more desirable. The model is then estimated and its predictions tested using U.S. tariff data. An empirical estimate of the costliness of revenue-raising is also obtained.

Total Factor Productivity, Human Capital and Outward Orientation: Differences by Stage of Ddevelopment and Geographic Regions

Do openness and human capital accumulation promote economic growth? While intuition argues yes, the existing empirical evidence provides mixed support for such assertions. We examine Cobb-Douglas production function specifications for a 30-year panel of 83 countries representing all regions of the world and all income groups. We estimate and compare labor and capital elasticities of output per worker across each of several income and geographic groups, finding significant differences in production technology. Then we estimate the total factor productivity series for each classification. Using determinants of total factor productivity that include, among many others, human capital, openness, and distortion of domestic prices relative to world prices, we find significant differences in results between the overall sample and sub-samples of countries. In particular, a policy of outward orientation may or may not promote growth in specific country groups. even if geared to reducing price distortion and increasing openness. Human capital plays a smaller role in enhancing growth through total factor productivity.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Multisectorial Economies

We develop a two-sector economy where each sector is classified as classical/Keynesian (contract/noncontract) in the labor market and traded/nontraded in the product market. We consider the effects of changes in monetary and exchange rate policy on sectoral and aggregate prices and outputs for different sectoral characterizations. Duca (1987) shows that nominal wage rigidity facilitates the effectiveness of monetary policy even in the classical sector. We demonstrate that trade price rigidity provides a similar path for the effectiveness of monetary policy, in this case, even when both sectors are classical.