Direct and Indirect Measures of Capacity Utilization: A Nonparametric Analysis of U.S. Manufacturing

We measure the capacity output of a firm as the maximum amount producible by a firm given a specific quantity of the quasi-fixed input and an overall expenditure constraint for its choice of variable inputs. We compute this indirect capacity utilization measure for the total manufacturing sector in the US as well as for a number of disaggregated industries, for the period 1970-2001. We find considerable variation in capacity utilization rates both across industries and over years within industries. Our results suggest that the expenditure constraint was binding, especially in periods of high interest rates.

Technical Efficiency of State Owned Enterprises in China (1980-1989): An Assessment of the Economic Reforms

This paper uses Data Envelopment Analysis to examine changes in levels of technical efficiency over time in China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) during 1980-1989. Our paper adds to the growing body of literature in this area by obtaining measures of technical efficiency of individual SOEs over years and by identifying how different aspects of the reforms have affected efficiency. We estimate a Tobit regression model, using the technical efficiency score as the dependent variable and a set of reform variables and firm attributes as regressors. We find that specific aspects of the reforms were very effective in improving technical efficiency.

Emissions Control and the Regulation of Product Markets: The Case of Automobiles

The paper investigates alternative policies to regulate emissions from polluting product markets, specifically considering the case of the automobiles market. The two policies we consider are: a quota that limits the quantity produced of the polluting model and a more flexible average efficiency standard that requires a minimum energy efficiency across all models produced by a firm, similar to the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. We use a duopoly model of vertical differentiation where firms produce both an economy (i.e., low polluting) version and a luxury (i.e., high polluting) version of a given product. We show that while a quota can raise firm profit over a certain range, CAFE always reduces firm profit relative to the pre-regulation. We also show that while the quota reduces emissions, it is possible that emissions increase under CAFE. The optimal policy choice will depend on the magnitude of unit damages. We show that when unit damages are sufficiently high, the quota policy is more efficient than the average efficiency standard. This suggests that instead of tightening CAFE to limit damages from emissions, policy makers can shift to a quota policy which is both welfare enhancing and more profitable for firms.