Macroeconomic Rationality and Lucas' Misperceptions Model: Further Evidence from Forty-One Countries

Several researchers have examined Lucas's misperceptions model as well as various propositions derived from it within a cross-section empirical framework. The cross-section approach imposes a single monetary policy regime for the entire period. Our paper innovates on existing tests of those rational expectations propositions by allowing the simultaneous effect of monetary and short run aggregate supply (oil price) shocks on output behavior and the employment of advanced panel econometric techniques. Our empirical findings, for a sample of 41 countries over 1949 to 1999, provide evidence in favor of the majority of rational expectations propositions.

Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency

This paper considers the contacting approach to central banking in the context of a simple common agency model. The recent literature on optimal contracts suggests that the political principal of the central bank can design the appropriate incentive schemes that remedy for time-inconsistency problems in monetary policy. The effectiveness of such contracts, however, requires a central banker that attaches a positive weight to the incentive scheme. As a result, delegating monetary policy under such circumstances gives rise to the possibility that the central banker may respond to incentive schemes offered by other potential principals. We introduce common agency considerations in the design of optimal central banker contracts. We introduce two principals - society (government) and an interest group, whose objectives conflict with society's and we examine under what circumstances the government-offered or the interest-group-offered contract dominates. Our results largely depend on the type of bias that the interest group contract incorporates. In particular, when the interest group contract incorporates an inflationary bias the outcome depends on the principals' relative concern of the incentive schemes' costs. When the interest group contract incorporates an expansionary bias, however, it always dominates the government contract. A corollary of our results is that central banker contracts aiming to remove the expansionary bias of policymakers should be written explicitly in terms of the perceived bias.

Is the Great Moderation Ending? UK and US Evidence

The Great Moderation, the significant decline in the variability of economic activity, provides a most remarkable feature of the macroeconomic landscape in the last twenty years. A number of papers document the beginning of the Great Moderation in the US and the UK. In this paper, we use the Markov regime-switching models of Hamilton (1989) and Hamilton and Susmel (1994) to document the end of the Great Moderation. The Great Moderation in the US and the UK begin at different point in time. The explanations for the Great Moderation fall into generally three different categories -- good monetary policy, improved inventory management, or good luck. Summers (2005) argues that a combination of good monetary policy and better inventory management led to the Great Moderation. The end of the Great Moderation, however, occurs at approximately the same time in both the US and the UK. It seems unlikely that good monetary policy would turn into bad policy or that better inventory management would turn into worse management. Rather, the likely explanation comes from bad luck. Two likely culprits exist . energy-price and housing-price shocks.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the central bank should adopt a loss function that differs from the social loss function. Carefully designing the central bank s loss function with consistent targets can harmonize optimal and consistent policy. This desirable result emerges from two observations. First, the social loss function reflects a normative process that does not necessarily prove consistent with the structure of the microeconomy. Thus, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Second, an optimal loss function for the central bank must depend on the structure of that microeconomy. In addition, this paper shows that control theory provides a benchmark for institution design in a game-theoretical framework.

Measuring Potential Output and Output Gap and Macroeconomic Policy: The Case of Kenya

Measuring the level of an economy.s potential output and output gap are essential in identifying a sustainable non-inflationary growth and assessing appropriate macroeconomic policies. The estimation of potential output helps to determine the pace of sustainable growth while output gap estimates provide a key benchmark against which to assess inflationary or disinflationary pressures suggesting when to tighten or ease monetary policies. These measures also help to provide a gauge in the determining the structural fiscal position of the government. This paper attempts to measure Kenya.s potential output and output gap using alternative statistical techniques and structural methods. Estimation of potential output and output gap using these techniques shows varied results. The estimated potential output growth using different methods gave a range of .2.9 to 2.4 percent for 2000 and a range of .0.8 to 4.6 for 2001. Although various methods produce varied results, they however provided a broad consensus on the over-all trend and performance of the Kenyan economy. This study found that firstly, potential output growth is declining over the recent time and secondly, the Kenyan economy is contracting in the recent years.