Monetary Policy Delegation, Contract Costs, and Contract Targets

We reconsider the optimal central banker contract derived in Walsh (1995). We show that if the government's objective function places weight (value) on the cost of the contract, then the optimal inflation contract does not completely neutralize the inflation bias. That is, a fraction of the inflation bias emerges in the resulting inflation rate after the central banker's monetary policy decision. Furthermore, the more concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or the less selfish (more benevolent) is the central banker, the smaller is the share of the inflation bias eliminated by the contract. No matter how concerned the government is about the cost of the contract or how unselfish (benevolent) the central banker is, the contract always reduces the inflationary bias by at least half. Finally, a central banker contract written in terms of output (i.e., incorporating an output target) can completely eradicate the inflationary bias, regardless of concerns about contract costs.

Monetary Policy, Exchange Rate Overshooting, and Endogenous Physical Capital

We develop an open economy macroeconomic model with real capital accumulation and microeconomic foundations. We show that expansionary monetary policy causes exchange rate overshooting, not once, but potentially twice; the secondary repercussion comes through the reaction of firms to changed asset prices and the firms' decisions to invest in real capital. The model sheds further light on the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates, and it suggests that changes in corporate sector profitability may affect exchange rates through international portfolio diversification in corporate securities.

The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy

This paper shows that optimal policy and consistent policy outcomes require the use of control-theory and game-theory solution techniques. While optimal policy and consistent policy often produce different outcomes even in a one-period model, we analyze consistent policy and its outcome in a simple model, finding that the cause of the inconsistency with optimal policy traces to inconsistent targets in the social loss function. As a result, the social loss function cannot serve as a direct loss function for the central bank. Accordingly, we employ implementation theory to design a central bank loss function (mechanism design) with consistent targets, while the social loss function serves as a social welfare criterion. That is, with the correct mechanism design for the central bank loss function, optimal policy and consistent policy become identical. In other words, optimal policy proves implementable (consistent).

Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: A Note

Kydland and Prescott (1977) develop a simple model of monetary policy making, where the central bank needs some commitment technique to achieve optimal monetary policy over time. Although not their main focus, they illustrate the difference between consistent and optimal policy in a sequential-decision one-period world. We employ the analytical method developed in Yuan and Miller (2005), whereby the government appoints a central bank with consistent targets or delegates consistent targets to the central bank. Thus, the central bank s welfare function differs from the social welfare function, which cause consistent policy to prove optimal.

Total Factor Productivity and Monetary Policy: Evidence from Conditional Volatility

This paper empirically assesses whether monetary policy affects real economic activity through its affect on the aggregate supply side of the macroeconomy. Analysts typically argue that monetary policy either does not affect the real economy, the classical dichotomy, or only affects the real economy in the short run through aggregate demand new Keynesian or new classical theories. Real business cycle theorists try to explain the business cycle with supply-side productivity shocks. We provide some preliminary evidence about how monetary policy affects the aggregate supply side of the macroeconomy through its affect on total factor productivity, an important measure of supply-side performance. The results show that monetary policy exerts a positive and statistically significant effect on the supply-side of the macroeconomy. Moreover, the findings buttress the importance of countercyclical monetary policy as well as support the adoption of an optimal money supply rule. Our results also prove consistent with the effective role of monetary policy in the Great Moderation as well as the more recent rise in productivity growth.

The Geographic Distribution of the Size and Timing of Monetary Policy Actions

This paper examines the magnitude and timing of the effects of changes in the monetary base on the aggregate and regional changes in bank loans within the United States. We consider both Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) regions, and individual states and the District of Columbia for our regional analysis. The empirical analysis provides some insight on the bank-lending channel of monetary policy. We find strong evidence of a 4-quarter lag in the effect of changes in the monetary base on bank loans. That finding proves robust across all regions and nearly all states.

Monetary Policy Under a Currency Board

The consensus view is that central banks under currency boards do not have tools for active monetary policy. In this paper, we analyze the foreign exchange fee as a monetary policy instrument that can be used by a central bank under a currency board. We develop a general equilibrium model showing that changes in this fee may have the same effects as a change in the monetary policy stance. Thus central banks under the currency board are shown to have an avenue to implement active monetary policy.

Expectations, and Credibility in a Model of Monetary Policy

Recent monetary history has been characterized by monetary authorities which have been, alternatively hard and soft on inflation. In a vintage capital framework, investment decisions are not easily reversed. Therefore, expectations of policy as well as current policy are important to the investment decision. Here, a vintage capital model is used to assess the value of central bank credibility for a policy change. Policy in this model is assumed to be private information of the central banker. Agents learn about that policy which to study the ensuing transitional dynamics following a change in monetary policy regime.

Monetary Policy in a Portfolio Balance Model with Endogenous Physical Capital

We develop a portfolio balance model with real capital accumulation. The introduction of real capital as an asset as well as a good produced and demanded by firms enriches extant portfolio balance models of exchange rate determination. We show that expansionary monetary policy causes exchange rate overshooting, not once, but twice; the secondary repercussion comes through the reaction of firms to changed asset prices and the firms' decisions to invest in real capital. The model sheds further light on the volatility of real and nominal exchange rates, and it suggests that changes in corporate sector profitability may affect exchange rates through portfolio diversification in corporate securities.

Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy in Multisectorial Economies

We develop a two-sector economy where each sector is classified as classical/Keynesian (contract/noncontract) in the labor market and traded/nontraded in the product market. We consider the effects of changes in monetary and exchange rate policy on sectoral and aggregate prices and outputs for different sectoral characterizations. Duca (1987) shows that nominal wage rigidity facilitates the effectiveness of monetary policy even in the classical sector. We demonstrate that trade price rigidity provides a similar path for the effectiveness of monetary policy, in this case, even when both sectors are classical.

A General Schema for Optimal Monetary Policymaking: Objectives and Rules

This paper examines four equivalent methods of optimal monetary policymaking, committing to the social loss function, using discretion with the central bank long-run and short-run loss functions, and following monetary policy rules. All lead to optimal economic performance. The same performance emerges from these different policymaking methods because the central bank actually follows the same (similar) policy rules. These objectives (the social loss function, the central bank long-run and short-run loss functions) and monetary policy rules imply a complete regime for optimal policy making. The central bank long-run and short-run loss functions that produce the optimal policy with discretion differ from the social loss function. Moreover, the optimal policy rule emerges from the optimization of these different central bank loss functions.

Does the Federal Reserve Follow a Non-Linear Taylor Rule?

The Taylor rule has become one of the most studied strategies for monetary policy. Yet, little is known whether the Federal Reserve follows a non-linear Taylor rule. This paper employs the smooth transition regression model and asks the question: does the Federal Reserve change its policy-rule according to the level of inflation and/or the output gap? I find that the Federal Reserve does follow a non-linear Taylor rule and, more importantly, that the Federal Reserve followed a non-linear Taylor rule during the golden era of monetary policy, 1985-2005, and a linear Taylor rule throughout the dark age of monetary policy, 1960-1979. Thus, good monetary policy is associated with a non-linear Taylor rule: once inflation approaches a certain threshold, the Federal Reserve adjusts its policy-rule and begins to respond more forcefully to inflation.

Financial Liberalization and Inflationary Dynamics in the Context of a Small Open Economy

The paper develops a short-run model of a small open financially repressed economy characterized by unorganized money markets, capital good imports, capital mobility, wage indexation, and flexible exchange rates. The analysis shows that financial liberalization, in the form of an increased rate of interest on deposits and tight monetary policy, unambiguously and unconditionally causes deflation. Moreover, the results do not depend on the degree of capital mobility and structure of wage setting. The paper recommends that a small open developing economy should deregulate interest rates and tighten monetary policy if reducing inflation is a priority. The pre-requisite for such a policy, however, requires the establishment of a flexible exchange rate regime.

Inflation Targeting and Output Growth: Evidence from Aggregate European Data

This paper evaluates inflation targeting and assesses its merits by comparing alternative targets in a macroeconomic model. We use European aggregate data to evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules under alternative inflation targets in terms of output losses. We employ two major alternative policy rules, forward-looking and spontaneous adjustment, and three alternative inflation targets, zero percent, two percent, and four percent inflation rates. The simulation findings suggest that forward-looking rules contributed to macroeconomic stability and increase monetary policy credibility. The superiority of a positive inflation target, in terms of output losses, emerges for the aggregate data. The same methodology, when applied to individual countries, however, suggests that country-specific flexible inflation targeting can improve employment prospects in Europe.

Predicting the Fed

Predicting the federal funds rate and beating the federal funds futures market: mission impossible? Not so. We employ a Markov transition process and show that this model outperforms the federal funds futures market in predicting the target federal funds rate. Thus, by using purely historical data we are able to better explain future monetary policy than a forward looking measure like the federal funds futures rate. The fact that the federal funds futures market can be beaten by a statistical model, suggests that the federal funds futures market lacks eciency. The mar- ket allocates too much weight to current Federal Reserve communication and other real-time macro events, and allocates too little weight to past monetary policy behavior.