Race and discourse analysis: Building a dialogue in health service research and health care settings

Using a framework for discourse analysis developed by Van Dijk, the investigator will pinpoint the pathological forms of discourse on race, defined as 'race talk' in three professional domains: health services research, public health provider organizations, and literature on multiculturalism. Attention will then turn to developing an analytical strategy for building more meaningful dialogue on race. The retrieval of potential resources for dialogue will be drawn from the third domain. Analysis will focus on enhancing the prospects of converting 'race talk' into dialogue. This will be accomplished by characterizing the normative preconditions as formal procedural requirements for dialogue and then supplementing these conditions with others related specifically to race. From here, the practical implications of combining procedural requirements and resources in each of the domains will be considered. Finally, the author will attempt to determine how these selected resources might be employed to transform 'race talk' in practice and lay the groundwork for a dialogue of understanding. ^

A discourse-theoretic perspective on the bioethical-legal framework of genetic counseling

The reflexive nature of reason and the unique relationship reason shares with autonomy in Kant's philosophy is the theoretical basis of this dissertation. The principle of respect for autonomy undergirds the two main legal and ethical tenets of genetic counseling, an emerging profession trying to accommodate the sweeping changes that have occurred in clinical genetics, clinical ethics, and case law applicable to medicine. These two tenets of the counseling profession, informed consent and nondirectiveness, both share a principlist interpretation of autonomy that I argue is flawed due to its connection to: instrumental forms of reasoning, empirical theories of action supporting rational choice, and a liberal paradigm of law. I offer an alternative bioethical-legal framework that is based in the Kantian tradition in law and ethics through the complex theories of Jurgen Habermas. Following Habermas's reconstruction of the mutually constituting notions of private and public autonomy, I will argue for a richer conceptualization of autonomy that can have significant implications for the legal and bioethical concepts supporting the profession of genetic counseling, and which can ultimately change counseling practice. ^

A discourse-theoretic approach to negotiated rulemaking

In 1996 and in 1997, Congress ordered the Secretary of Health and Human Services to undertake a process of negotiated rulemaking, which is authorized under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, on three separate rulemaking matters. Other Federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Health and Safety Administration, have also made use of this procedure. As part of the program to reinvent government, President Clinton has issued an executive order requiring federal agencies to engage in some negotiated rulemaking procedures. I present an analytic, interpretative and critical approach to looking at the statutory and regulatory provisions for negotiated rulemaking as related to issues of democratic governance surrounding the problem of delegation of legislative power. The paradigm of law delineated by Jürgen Habermas, which sets law the task of achieving social or value integration as well as integration of systems, provides the background theory for a critique of such processes. My research questions are two. First, why should a citizen obey a regulation which is the result of negotiation by directly interested parties? Second, what is the potential effect of negotiated rulemaking on other institutions for deliberative democracy? For the internal critique I argue that the procedures for negotiated rulemaking will not produce among the participants the agreement and cooperation which is the legislative intent. For the external critique I argue that negotiated rulemaking will not result in democratically-legitimated regulation. In addition, the practice of negotiated rulemaking will further weaken the functioning of the public sphere, as Habermas theorizes it, as the central institution of deliberative democracy. The primary implication is the need to mitigate further development of administrative agencies as isolated, self-regulating systems, which have been loosened from the controls of democratic governance, through the development of a robust public sphere in which affected persons may achieve mutual understanding. ^