Explaining the Long-Term Trend in Violent Crime: A Heuristic Scheme and Some Methodological Considerations

There has been a discontinuous but fairly persistent long-term decline in homicide rates in core European countries since about 1500. Since the 1950s, however, we observe an upward trend in violent crime not only in Europe but in almost all of the economically advanced nations that combine democratic political structures with free-market economies. The paper presents an explanatory scheme designed to account for both, the long decline and its apparent reversal. The theoretical model draws heavily upon ideas taken from the sociological work of Emile Durkheim and Norbert Elias—with some modifications and extensions. It seeks to integrate sociological and historical perspectives and to give due weight to both, structural and developmental forces. A key hypothesis is that the pacifying effects of the erosion of traditional collectivism can only be maintained to the extent by which “cooperative individualism” dominates over against the forces of “disintegrative individualism.” Some suggestions are made concerning the selection of appropriate indicators and the handling of methodological problems related to causal attribution.

Institutions, Anomie, and Violent Crime: Clarifying and Elaborating Institutional-Anomie Theory

A limited but accumulating body of research and theoretical commentary offers support for core claims of the “institutional-anomie theory” of crime (IAT) and points to areas needing further development. In this paper, which focuses on violent crime, we clarify the concept of social institutions, elaborate the cultural component of IAT, derive implications for individual behavior, summarize empirical applications, and propose directions for future research. Drawing on Talcott Parsons, we distinguish the “subjective” and “objective” dimensions of institutional dynamics and discuss their interrelationship. We elaborate on the theory’s cultural component with reference to Durkheim’s distinction between “moral” and “egoistic” individualism and propose that a version of the egoistic type characterizes societies in which the economy dominates the institutional structure, anomie is rampant, and levels of violent crime are high. We also offer a heuristic model of IAT that integrates macro- and individual levels of analysis. Finally, we discuss briefly issues for the further theoretical elaboration of this macro-social perspective on violent crime. Specifically, we call attention to the important tasks of explaining the emergence of economic dominance in the institutional balance of power and of formulating an institutional account for distinctive punishment practices, such as the advent of mass incarceration in the United States.

Violence, Crime, and Violent Crime

I propose a dual conceptualization of violent crime. Since violent crime is both violence and crime, theories of aggression and deviance are required to understand it. I argue that both harm-doing and rule breaking are instrumental behaviors and that a bounded rational choice approach can account for both behaviors. However, while some of the causes of harm-doing and deviance (and violent and nonviolent crime) are the same, some are different. Theories of crime and deviance cannot explain why one only observes individual and group differences in violent crime and theories of aggression and violence cannot explain why one observes differences in all types of crimes. Such theories are “barking up the wrong tree.”

Deprivation, Violence, and Conflict: An Analysis of “Naxalite” Activity in the Districts of India

This paper asks: is it a fact that there is more violence in districts affected by Naxalite (Maoist) activity compared to those which are free of Naxalite activity? And can the existence of Naxalite activity in some districts of India, but not in others, be explained by differences in economic and social conditions? This study identifies districts in India in which there was significant Naxalite activity and correlating the findings with district-level economic, social, and crime indicators. The econometric results show that, after controlling for other variables, Naxalite activity in a district had, if anything, a dampening effect on its level of violent crime and crimes against women. Furthermore, even after controlling for other variables, the probability of a district being Naxalite-affected rose with an increase in its poverty rate and fell with a rise in its literacy rate. So, one prong in an anti-Naxalite strategy would be to address the twin issues of poverty and illiteracy in India.

Modernity Strikes Back? A Historical Perspective on the Latest Increase in Interpersonal Violence (1960-1990)

There is a plethora of criminological explanations why criminal violence increased during the three decades between the early 1960s and the early 1990s. This paper argues that most available interpretations are lacking in three respects: they lack a historical perspective that anchors the three critical decades in a wider understanding of long-term trends; they take the nation-state as their unit of analysis and disregard important commonalities across the Western world; and they pay insufficient attention to different trends in broad categories of physical violence.This paper therefore takes a macro-level and long-term perspective on violent crime, focussing on European homicide during the past 160 years. It demonstrates that the period of increase was preceded by a long-term decline and convergence of homicide rates from the 1840s to the 1950s. Also, it shows that both the decline and the increase primarily resulted from temporal variation in the likelihood of physical aggression between men in public space. It argues that explanations of these common trends need to take into account broad long-term cultural change common to Western societies. In particular, the paper suggests that shifts in culturally transmitted and institutionally embedded ideals of the conduct of life may provide an explanation for long-term change in levels of interpersonal violence.

Hating the neighbors: The role of hate crime in the perpetuation of black residential segregation

Grounded in group conflict theory and the defended neighborhoods thesis, this nationwide empirical study of cities and their residential segregation levels, examines the occurrence of hate crime using data on for all U.S. cities with populations over 95,000, and data compiled from the Uniform Crime Report for hate crime, in conjunction with 2000 census data. Hate crime is any illegal act motivated by pre-formed bias against, in this case, a person’s real or perceived race. This research asks: Do hate crime levels predict white/black segregation levels? How does hate crime predict different measures of white/black segregation? I use the dissimilarity index measure of segregation operationalized as a continuous, binary and ordinal variable, to explore whether hate crime predicts segregation of blacks from whites. In cities with higher rates of hate crime there was higher dissimilarity between whites and blacks, controlling for other factors. The segregation level was more likely to be “high” in a city where hate crime occurred. Blacks are continually multiply disadvantaged and distinctly affected by hate crime and residential segregation. Prior studies of residential segregation have focused almost exclusively on individual choice, residents’ lack of finances, or discriminatory actions that prevent racial minorities from moving, to explore the correlates of segregation. Notably absent from these studies are measures reflecting the level of hate crime occurring in cities. This study demonstrates the importance of considering hate crime and neighborhood conflict when contemplating the causes of residential segregation.

Is the Market Eroding Moral Norms? A Micro-Analytical Validation of Some Ideas of Anomie Theory

Anomie theorists have been reporting the suppression of shared welfare orientations by the overwhelming dominance of economic values within capitalist societies since before the outset of neoliberalism debate. Obligations concerning common welfare are more and more often subordinated to the overarching aim of realizing economic success goals. This should be especially valid with for social life in contemporary market societies. This empirical investigation examines the extent to which market imperatives and values of the societal community are anchored within the normative orientations of market actors. Special attention is paid to whether the shape of these normative orientations varies with respect to the degree of market inclusion. Empirical analyses, based on the data of a standardized written survey within the German working population carried out in 2002, show that different types of normative orientation can be distinguished among market actors. These types are quite similar to the well-known types of anomic adaptation developed by Robert K. Merton in “Social Structure and Anomie” and are externally valid with respect to the prediction of different forms of economic crime. Further analyses show that the type of normative orientation actors adopt within everyday life depends on the degree of market inclusion. Confirming anomie theory, it is shown that the individual willingness to subordinate matters of common welfare to the aim of economic success—radical market activism—gets stronger the more actors are included in the market sphere. Finally, the relevance of reported findings for the explanation of violent behavior, especially with view to varieties of corporate violence, is discussed.

Anomic Crime in Post-Welfarist Societies. Cult of the Individual, Integration Patterns and Delinquency

Post-Fordist economies come along with post-welfarist societies marked by intensified cultural individualism and increased structural inequalities. These conditions are commonly held to be conducive to relative deprivation and, thereby, anomic crime. At the same time, post-welfarist societies develop a new ‘balance of power’ between institutions providing for welfare regulation, such as the family, the state and the (labour) market – and also the penal system. These institutions are generally expected to improve social integration, ensure conformity and thus reduce anomic crime. Combining both perspectives, we analyse the effects of moral individualism, social inequality, and different integration strategies on crime rates in contemporary societies through the lenses of anomie theory. To test our hypotheses, we draw on time-series cross-section data compiled from different data sources (OECD, UN, WHO, WDI) for twenty developed countries in the period 1970-2004, and run multiple regressions that control for country-specific effects. Although we find some evidence that the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies to a certain extent prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime, the results are not very robust. Moreover, reservations have to be made regarding the effects of “market” income inequality as well as familialist, unionist and liberalist employment policies that are shown to have reversed effects in our sample: the former reducing, the latter occasionally increasing anomic crime. As expected, the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies generally prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime. Nevertheless, we conclude that the new cult of the individual undermines the effectiveness of conservative and social-democratic integration strategies and drives societies towards more “liberal” regimes that build on incentive as well as punitive elements.

Clausewitz’s “Wondrous Trinity” as a Coordinate System of War and Violent Conflict

Rather than discarding Clausewitz’s theory of war in response to the revolutionary changes in modern warfare, this article articulates a broader theory of war based on his concept of the “wondrous trinity,” identifying it as his true legacy. The author shows that the concept of trinitarian war attributed to Clausewitz by his critics, which seems to be applicable only to wars between states, is a caricature of Clausewitz’s theory. He goes on to develop Clausewitz’s theory that war is composed of the three tendencies of violence/force, fighting, and the affiliation of the combatants to a warring community. Each war can be analyzed as being composed of these three tendencies and their opposites.