Changing the Face of Traditional Education

At large, research universities, a common approach for teaching hundreds of undergraduate students at one time is the traditional, large, lecture-based course. Trends indicate that over the next decade there will be an increase in the number of large, campus courses being offered as well as larger enrollments in courses currently offered. As universities investigate alternative means to accommodate more students and their learning needs, Web-based instruction provides an attractive delivery mode for teaching large, on-campus courses. This article explores a theoretical approach regarding how Web-based instruction can be designed and developed to provide quality education for traditional, on-campus, undergraduate students. The academic debate over the merit of Web-based instruction for traditional, on-campus students has not been resolved. This study identifies and discusses instructional design theory for adapting a large, lecture-based course to the Web.

Integrating a traditional minority into a Nordic society: Elite discourse on the Finnish Roma

Contemporary citizenship studies have been more concerned with the theory and philosophy of citizenship than with empirical studies. The general objective of this contribution is to broaden the understanding of how notions of citizenship are constructed and re-valued in the social world. The study draws on a qualitative analysis of political elite discourse on Romani issues in the Finnish Parliament from 1989-2003. How issues concerning the Roma are debated elucidates the dilemmas of universal rights and duties within the Nordic welfare model, and the possibilities for cultural diversity within this framework. While the Finnish parliamentary debate accentuated tolerance and the acceptance of difference as strengthening factors for Finnish social citizenship, it was not before the new millennium that the political discourse changed to increasingly stress notions of discrimination and structural inequalities in relation to the incapability to provide for a full an inclusive citizenship as regards the Romani minority.

Sui Generis Rights for the Protection of Traditional Cultural Expressions Policy Implications

Within the international community there have been many calls for better protection of traditional cultural expressions (TCEs), for which classic instruments of intellectual property rights do not seem to fit. In response, at least five model laws have been advanced within the last 40 years. These are referred to as sui generis because, though they generally belong to the realm of intellectual property they structurally depart from classic copyright law to accommodate the needs of the holders of TCEs. The purpose of this paper is to provide a well-founded basis for national policy makers who wish to implement protection for TCEs within their country. This is achieved by systematically comparing and evaluating economic effects that can be expected to result from these regulatory alternatives and a related system or private ordering. Specifically, we compare if and how protection preferences of local communities are met as well as the social costs that are likely to arise from the different model laws.

Centralization versus Delegation in an Experimental Capital Budgeting Setting

In an experiment, we model two stylized facts about capital budgeting practice, budgetary slack creation and delegation of decision-making authority. In our setting, under centralization, headquarters announces a budget, the division manager gives a cost report, and headquarters decides on the project. Under delegation, headquarters allocates a budget to the manager, and the manager is authorized to make the investment decision. We argue that the ability of headquarters to commit to a budget moderates the effect of delegation, and we find evidence in favor of our argument as there is an interaction effect of delegation and commitment to budgets. The effects of delegation are particularly strong when budgets are non-binding as delegation serves as a substitute for commitment in this case. This leads to smaller expenditures and to a higher headquarters’ payoff under delegation than under centralization. In contrast, when headquarters can commit to the budget, the descriptive data are consistent with our conjectures about the effects of honesty preferences, but the effects are too small to be significant.