Endangering of Businesses by the German Inheritance Tax? – An Empirical Analysis

This contribution addresses the substantial tax privilege for businesses introduced by the German Inheritance Tax Act 2009. Advocates of the vast or even entire tax exemption for businesses stress the potential damage of the inheritance tax on businesses, as those often lack liquidity to meet tax liability. This submission tackles this issue empirically based on data of the German Inheritance Tax Statistics and the SOEP. The results indicate that former German inheritance tax law has not endangered transferred businesses. Hence, there is no need for the tremendous tax privilege for businesses in current German inheritance tax law. An alternative flat inheritance tax without tax privileges, which meets revenue neutrality per tax class according to current tax law, provokes in some cases relative high tax loads which might trouble businesses.

Investment Valuation with Tax-optimized Financing Decisions and a Tax-optimized Default Alternative

In this paper we evaluate an indivisible investment project that is carried out in a corporation under very simple premises. In particular, we discuss a one-period model with certainty, the pure domestic case and proportional tax rates. Surprisingly, the decision problem turns out to be rather complex if one has to make allowance for different taxation of the corporation and its owner. Altogether there are more than 10 cases that have to be distinguished if the firm's managers want to make a correct decision, depending on the relation of personal and corporate tax rates.

Who has really paid for the Reconstruction of East Germany? Expected and Realized Returns on Real Estate Investments in East and West Germany in the 1990s

We evaluate the profitability of investments in residential property in Germany after unification with a focus on the comparison of East and West Germany. Calculations are carried out for (1) the after-tax return an investor might have expected at the beginning of the 1990s, and (2) the after-tax return that has been realized ten years after. We compare a set of statistical data for investments in fifty major cities by using complete financial budgeting. The results show that tax subsidies could not always protect investors from losing money, but they have boosted realized returns after tax considerably. Therefore, it was indeed the taxpayers, not the investors, who have borne the cost of reconstructing East Germany.