Is the Market Classification of Risk Always Efficient? - Evidence from German Third Party Motor Insurance

This paper studies the empirical effects of risk classification in the mandatory third-party motor insurance of Germany following the European Union’s directive to de-regulate insurance tariffs of 1994. We find evidence that inefficient risk categories had been selected while potentially efficient information was dismissed. Risk classification did generally not improve the efficiency of contracting or the composition of insureds in this market. These findings are partly explained by the continuing existence of institutional restraints in this market such as compulsory fixed coverage and unitary owner insurance.

Tariff-Specific Preferences and Their Influence on Price Sensitivity

For many services, consumers can choose among a range of optional tariffs that differ in their access and usage prices. Recent studies indicate that tariff-specific preferences may lead consumers to choose a tariff that does not minimize their expected billing rate. This study analyzes how tariff-specific preferences influence the responsiveness of consumers’ usage and tariff choice to changes in price. We show that consumer heterogeneity in tariff-specific preferences leads to heterogeneity in their sensitivity to price changes. Specifically, consumers with tariff-specific preferences are less sensitive to price increases of their preferred tariff than other consumers. Our results provide an additional reason why firms should offer multiple tariffs rather than a uniform nonlinear pricing plan to extract maximum consumer surplus.