The Magnetism of Power in Helping Relationships. Professional Attitude and Asymmetry

What makes helping relationships - or social interventions in general - so sensitive to abuse? These problems are directly related to the nature of the helping relationship. The core of this relationship is the inequality, the asymmetry, between the helper and the person being helped, and the dependence of the latter. Asymmetry is the driving force behind every social intervention and at the same time its weakest point. Handling asymmetry in an appropriate manner constitutes a major part of the work of the intervening party. This asymmetry makes heavy demands on the professional attitude of the intervening party i.e. the helper. Is s/he capable of dealing with dependence in an acceptable way? Is s/he well-versed in her/his profession? This article contains a comprehensive sketch of many of the possible dangers and pitfalls which beset asymmetric intervention relations. At the end it will be argued that, for a better understanding, the proximity of helping and power has to be taken into account.

Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia – Claim and Reality

This article discusses democratic elements in early Islamic sources and in the programs of the Algerian FIS (Front Islamique du Salut) and ANNAHDA in Tunesia. According to historic writings, Islam includes the principles of democratic consensus, consultation, and freedom of opinion, and an understanding that the sources of Islamic jurisdiction are subject to interpretation, that the sharia can be changed, and that religious authorities’ power to issue instructions on worldly matters is limited. These are the type of expectations that fundamentalist parties arouse when they speak of an Islamic caliphate as a state system. Against this background, an examination of the political system proposed until 1992 by the Algerian FIS shows that this system would have resulted in a very restrictive form of Islam. An investigation of the political system of the Tunisian fundamentalist leader Rached al-Ghannouchi reveals that the system he proposes may be designated as an Islamic democracy, since it takes into account separation of powers and pluralism of political parties. The head of state would be subject to the law in the same manner as the people. However, it is no liberal democracy, as he categorically rejects secularism, intends to punish apostates, and is only willing to allow political parties that are based on the religion of Islam. His state would only be a state of those citizens who follow Islam, completely neglecting secularist groups. Social conflicts and unrest are thus predetermined.

Anomic Crime in Post-Welfarist Societies. Cult of the Individual, Integration Patterns and Delinquency

Post-Fordist economies come along with post-welfarist societies marked by intensified cultural individualism and increased structural inequalities. These conditions are commonly held to be conducive to relative deprivation and, thereby, anomic crime. At the same time, post-welfarist societies develop a new ‘balance of power’ between institutions providing for welfare regulation, such as the family, the state and the (labour) market – and also the penal system. These institutions are generally expected to improve social integration, ensure conformity and thus reduce anomic crime. Combining both perspectives, we analyse the effects of moral individualism, social inequality, and different integration strategies on crime rates in contemporary societies through the lenses of anomie theory. To test our hypotheses, we draw on time-series cross-section data compiled from different data sources (OECD, UN, WHO, WDI) for twenty developed countries in the period 1970-2004, and run multiple regressions that control for country-specific effects. Although we find some evidence that the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies to a certain extent prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime, the results are not very robust. Moreover, reservations have to be made regarding the effects of “market” income inequality as well as familialist, unionist and liberalist employment policies that are shown to have reversed effects in our sample: the former reducing, the latter occasionally increasing anomic crime. As expected, the mismatch between cultural ideal (individual inclusion) and structural reality (stratified exclusion) increases the anomic pressure, whereas conservative (i. e. family-based), social-democratic (i. e. state-based) and liberal (i. e. market-based) integration strategies generally prove effective in controlling the incidence of crime. Nevertheless, we conclude that the new cult of the individual undermines the effectiveness of conservative and social-democratic integration strategies and drives societies towards more “liberal” regimes that build on incentive as well as punitive elements.