Price Delegation in Sales Organizations: An Empirical Investigation

The allocation of decision rights is an integral component of designing organizational architecture. Economists have long understood the importance of co-locating decision rights with the knowledge that is valuable to those decisions. Following this prescription, marketing scholars have developed strong theoretical arguments in favor of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. Empirical work, however, reveals a significant number of sales organizations yielding only minimal authority to their salespeople. Given this divergence between theory and practice, we develop and empirically test two mitigating factors that could potentially explain why firms restrict pricing authority. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 222 German sales organizations and find that the data are generally consistent with our conceptualization.

Integrating Pricing and Inventory Control: Is it Worth the Effort?

In this paper we first show that the gains achievable by integrating pricing and inventory control are usually small for classical demand functions. We then introduce reference price models and demonstrate that for this class of demand functions the benefits of integration with inventory control are substantially increased due to the price dynamics. We also provide some analytical results for this more complex model. We thus conclude that integrated pricing/inventory models could repeat the success of revenue management in practice if reference price effects are included in the demand model and the properties of this new model are better understood.