Education and Ideologies of the Knowledge Economy: Europe and the Politics of Emulation

The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein famously proposed a style of philosophy that was directed against certain pictures [bild] that tacitly direct our language and forms of life. His aim was to show the fly the way out of the fly bottle and to fight against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (Wittgenstein 1953, 115). In this context Wittgenstein is talking of philosophical pictures, deep metaphors that have structured our language but he does also use the term picture in other contexts (see Owen 2003, 83). I want to appeal to Wittgenstein in my use of the term ideology to refer to the way in which powerful underlying metaphors in neoclassical economics have a strong rhetorical and constitutive force at the level of public policy. Indeed, I am specifically speaking of the notion of ‘the performative’ in Wittgenstein and Austin. The notion of the knowledge economy has a prehistory in Hayek (1937; 1945) who founded the economics of knowledge in the 1930s, in Machlup (1962; 1970), who mapped the emerging employment shift to the US service economy in the early 1960s, and to sociologists Bell (1973) and Touraine (1974) who began to tease out the consequences of these changes for social structure in the post-industrial society in the early 1970s. The term has been taken up since by economists, sociologists, futurists and policy experts recently to explain the transition to the so-called ‘new economy’. It is not just a matter of noting these discursive strands in the genealogy of the ‘knowledge economy’ and related or cognate terms. We can also make a number of observations on the basis of this brief analysis. First, there has been a succession of terms like ‘postindustrial economy’, ‘information economy’, ‘knowledge economy’, ‘learning economy’, each with a set of related concepts emphasising its social, political, management or educational aspects. Often these literatures are not cross-threading and tend to focus on only one aspect of phenomena leading to classic dichotomies such as that between economy and society, knowledge and information. Second, these terms and their family concepts are discursive, historical and ideological products in the sense that they create their own meanings and often lead to constitutive effects at the level of policy. Third, while there is some empirical evidence to support claims concerning these terms, at the level of public policy these claims are empirically underdetermined and contain an integrating, visionary or futures component, which necessarily remains untested and is, perhaps, in principle untestable.

Imperatives in concessive clauses: compatibility between constructions

In his pioneering paper on “Performative Subordinate Clauses,” Lakoff (1984) claimed that subordinate clauses expressing a reason or concession allow imperatives conveying statements (i.e. assertive illocutionary force). While this analysis has gone unchallenged to this day, the present paper shows that Lakoff’s analysis is inadequate, in that reason and concessive clauses show a sharp contrast in the kinds of imperative utterances they permit. Contra Lakoff, concessive clauses with although, though and except (that) do allow imperative constructions conveying directive illocutionary forces to occur, whereas by contrast those with even though tend to disallow both types of imperatives. These findings can be explained in terms of compatibility between “component” constructions constituting a complex sentence. It is argued that the compatibility between imperatives (both directive and assertive types) and concessive adverbials (excluding even though) can be attributed to the latter’s loose integration into a matrix clause required by the former. Furthermore, it is argued that the incompatibility of even though with imperatives arises primarily from the incompatibility between the tight integration of even though and the loose integration required by imperatives, together with the associated incompatibility between the non-rectifying function of even though and the rectifying conjunction favored by imperatives.

Blindversuch

Blindversuch ist eine dreiwöchige performative Arbeit im Rahmen meiner plastisch-künstlerischen Arbeit, die ich im Februar 2007 durchgeführt habe. Über einen Zeitraum von drei Wochen habe ich meine Augen verschlossen und das physische Sehen eingestellt. Damit verzichtete ich freiwillig auf mein wichtigstes künstlerisches Werkzeug. Ich gab vor, blind zu sein und trug die Zeichen des Blindseins: Brille, Armbinde und einen weißen Stock. Unter der Bedingung des Nicht-Sehens und in der Begleitung von Assistenten führte ich mein Leben und Arbeiten weiter. Während dieser Zeit ersetzte ich meine visuelle Wahrnehmung durch technische Mittel. Ohne zu sehen produzierte ich mit Fotoapparat und Videokamera visuelles Material. Diese Aufnahmen entstanden infolge motorisch-akustisch-haptischer Eindrücke und situativer Reflexionen. Ergänzt werden meine Aufnahmen durch visuelles Fremdmaterial. Verschiedene Personen wurden beauftragt, mich filmisch und fotografisch zu begleiten. Auch ich selbst erstellte eine Audiodokumentation meiner Erfahrungen und Reflexionen als Nicht-Sehende: Wahrnehmung, Untersuchung und Notierung der veränderten rezeptiven Bedingungen. Es fand eine bewusste Aneignung des Raums als Nicht-Sehende statt. Dazu habe ich meine Fähigkeiten sowohl im Atelier als auch im Außenraum trainiert. Darüber hinaus wurde der Blindversuch durch das Max-Planck-Institut für Hirnforschung in Frankfurt am Main wissenschaftlich begleitet.